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Court finds that cohabitation is enough to terminate spousal maintenance payments. Sanseri v. Sanseri, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 25128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)

In Sanseri v. Sanseri, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 25128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), the Supreme Court, Monroe County, addressed the termination of spousal maintenance payments, specifically revisiting the standards for terminating maintenance in the absence of remarriage. The issue arose under Section 248 of the Domestic Relations Law (DRL), a provision that outlines when maintenance payments can be modified or terminated. The court had to determine whether a former spouse cohabitating with another person, but not remarried, could be grounds for terminating maintenance.

Background Facts
In this case, the husband and wife were in the process of a divorce, with maintenance payments ordered at the outset due to a significant disparity in their incomes. While the divorce proceedings continued, the husband filed a motion to terminate the maintenance payments. He argued that his wife, though not remarried, had entered into a relationship with another man and had engaged in behaviors that were akin to a marriage.

The wife admitted during testimony that she was living with another man, sharing a bedroom, pooling finances with a joint checking account, and even accepting an engagement ring from her partner. She acknowledged sharing various family activities and holidays with this person, listing him as an emergency contact for her child. Despite this, she insisted that she never presented herself as married to her partner. She also admitted in an email to her husband that she expected the maintenance payments to stop when she moved in with her significant other.

Based on these facts, the husband argued that the wife’s living arrangement was essentially a new marital relationship, even though they had not formally married, and thus sought to terminate his maintenance obligations.

Question Before the Court
The primary question before the court was whether the wife’s cohabitation with another man, under the circumstances described, constituted sufficient grounds for terminating maintenance payments under Section 248 of the DRL. More specifically, the court had to decide whether this type of relationship met the statutory requirement for terminating maintenance when there was no remarriage.

Court’s Decision
The court found that under the DRL, termination of maintenance could occur if it was shown that the recipient spouse was living with another person as though they were married. This standard was established in Northrup v. Northrup decades ago, which held that maintenance could only be terminated if the recipient was “habitually living” with another person and “holding herself out” as their spouse.

In this case, the court ruled that the wife’s conduct—living together, sharing finances, and family life—was sufficient evidence that she was holding herself out as being in a spousal-like relationship. While the wife insisted that she had not presented herself as married, the court concluded that the nature of her relationship met the standard set forth in Northrup. As a result, the court granted the husband’s motion to terminate maintenance payments.

Discussion
This case hinged on the interpretation of the DRL’s provisions regarding spousal maintenance and the impact of cohabitation on the continuation of those payments. Under DRL § 236, the primary grounds for modifying maintenance include a substantial change in circumstances or extreme hardship. In this case, there was no substantial change in the husband’s financial circumstances that would justify modifying or terminating the payments. However, DRL § 248 provided a different basis for termination, specifically allowing for the termination of maintenance when the recipient spouse is cohabitating with another person as if they were married.

The court’s ruling relied on the evolving understanding of marriage and cohabitation as economic partnerships. Over the years, the concept of spousal maintenance had shifted from simply providing financial support to enabling the recipient spouse to become economically independent. Under this new framework, the court examined whether the wife’s cohabitation with another man created an economic partnership that mirrored the financial interdependence of a married couple.

While Northrup had previously set a strict standard for proving cohabitation as a basis for terminating maintenance, the court in this case found that the wife’s conduct was consistent with holding herself out as being in a spousal-like relationship. The financial and social interdependence she demonstrated with her partner was enough to justify terminating the maintenance payments.

Conclusion
The court’s decision in this case reinforced the importance of analyzing spousal maintenance under the evolving framework of economic independence. Although the wife had not remarried, her cohabitation and financial interdependence with another man effectively replicated the economic partnership of a marriage. As a result, the court found that her former husband should no longer be required to make maintenance payments.

If you are involved in a similar dispute, it is important to consult with an experienced New York spousal support lawyer. Contact Stephen Bilkis & Associates for a free, no obligation consultation.

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