Long Island

Published on: May 7, 2015

Petitioner Asserts Right to Counsel via Legal Aid

by Stephen Bilkis

The basis of this application, made by the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County and the attorney in charge of the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County, is the refusal by the Judge of the District Court of Nassau County, to permit the petitioner to continue to represent defendant on a pending charge of violating Section 240.20(5) and 240.20(6) of the Penal Law.

On June 24, 1971 defendant appeared pro se in the Arraignment Part of the District Court in response to the charge supra. At that time it is alleged that defendant indicated he could not afford an attorney and the matter was adjourned to June 20, 1971 and July 29, 1971 when defendant was arraigned. At that time defendant was represented by the Legal Aid Society to whom the case had been referred and who accepted defendant as a client.

Published on: March 31, 2015

Respondent Seeks to Dismiss Proceedings

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, by motion dated January 5, 2009, respondent seeks to dismiss the instant proceeding, alleging that she is not a licensee and therefore cannot be evicted in a summary proceeding. Petitioner opposes the motion and, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b), requests summary judgment and a judgment of possession.

A Nassau Divorce Lawyer said that, according to the affidavits of the parties, respondent, a 42 year-old attorney, is petitioner’s daughter-in-law and was married to petitioner’s son in 2001. Soon thereafter, the couple moved into the subject premises located at 345 Harbor Drive, Oyster Bay, New York. The premises are described as a “beach cottage” located on a parcel of land solely owned by petitioner, whose own residence is on the same parcel of land.

Respondent and her husband resided together at the subject premises with the permission of petitioner until March 2007, when respondent’s husband moved out. Respondent’s husband then filed a divorce proceeding, which is currently pending in Suffolk County Supreme Court. Petitioner has served respondent with a 10-day notice to quit pursuant to RPAPL 713 and commenced the instant summary proceeding to evict the respondent from the subject premises, contending that respondent is a licensee.

Published on: March 7, 2015

Plaintiffs Move for a Preliminary Injunction

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiff, a builder, purchased a certain piece of property at New York in February 1996. Prior to purchasing the property he ascertained that the property was located in a Residence C zone which requires a minimum lot area of 10,000 square feet. He intended to subdivide the 21,383 square foot lot into two parcels and construct at least one and possibly two new homes on the property. Upon closing on the purchase of the subject property on September 19, 1996, he applied for approval of the subdivision. Thereafter, he was informed by the Nassau County Planning Commission that approval to subdivide was not required.

On or about October 16, 1996, plaintiff filed an Application for Permit to Build or Install with the Department of Planning and Research, Building Division of the Town of Oyster Bay. He was informed that his permit application would not be reviewed because the Town Board was considering a zoning reclassification for the area that included his property. Plaintiff learned that, based upon a petition signed by area residents, the Town Board was considering 1) changing the zone from Residence C (10,000 square feet) to Residence B-1 (20,000+ square feet) and 2) adopting a moratorium on building permits for new home construction. A public hearing was scheduled for October 29, 1996.

Published on: March 7, 2015

Issue in this Case Deals with Whether Plaintiff Can Pursue a Tax Certiorari Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner, an owner of a parcel of real property improved by a one-family dwelling in the Village of Atlantic Beach, commenced this proceeding pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7 against the village, its Board of Assessors and its Board of Assessment Review seeking, inter alia, review of the assessment of his property for the tax year 1987/88, a declaratory judgment invalidating the respondents’ method of reassessing the value of real property only upon resale and an injunction restraining the respondents from levying and collecting taxes with respect to the petitioner’s property for the 1987/88 tax year based upon its assessment pursuant to this challenged methodology. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and this appeal ensued.

The petitioner purchased the subject parcel of real property in June 1986 for the sum of $166,000. At the time of the purchase, the total assessment placed against the property was $14,505. Following the transfer of title, the value of the property was reassessed in the sum of $36,520. The petitioner filed a protest application with the Board of Assessment Review of the village after the increased assessment appeared on the village’s 1987/88 tentative assessment roll. Specifically, the petitioner complained that the assessor’s method of increasing the assessments on only those properties which were the subject of transfer to new owners in the taxing jurisdiction was illegal and discriminatory. The final tax roll reflected the increased assessment on the petitioner’s property thereby implicitly confirming the challenged reassessment.

Published on: March 3, 2015

Court Listens to Case Dealing with Article 16 of the CPLR

by Stephen Bilkis

The issue raised in this case involves the application of Article 16 of the CPLR and its effect on the instructions to be given to the jury concerning apportionment of fault between tortfeasors, one of whom was negligent and the other an intentional tortfeasor, not a party to the lawsuit.

Plaintiff and her husband had an ongoing marital dispute. He had in the recent past thrown a substance in plaintiff’s eyes, temporarily blinding her, stolen her car and threatened to kill her. On January 8, 1992, plaintiff obtained a Temporary Order of protection against her husband from the Family Court Queens County. The order was renewed by that court on January 27, 1992 and was in effect on the night of the incident which gave rise to the suit against the County, February 13, 1992. The Family Court had also issued a warrant for the husband’s arrest.

Published on: February 17, 2015

Court Decides Whether to Terminate Parental Rights

by Stephen Bilkis

In three related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b and Family Court Act article 6 to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appeals from three orders of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (Dane, J.)(one as to each child), all dated December 22, 2010, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 8, 2010, made after a fact-finding hearing, finding that she permanently neglected the subject children, terminated her parental rights and transferred child custody and guardianship of the subject children to the Commissioner of the Nassau County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.

On the contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court properly found that she permanently neglected the subject children Shanea R. and Kyshawn F. The petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to assist the mother in maintaining contact with the children and planning for the children’s future ( see [95 A.D.3d 885]Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824;Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 474 N.Y.S.2d 421, 462 N.E.2d 1139). These efforts included repeated referrals of the mother to drug treatment programs, the monitoring of her progress in these programs, repeated advice to the mother that she must attend and complete the drug treatment programs, and the scheduling of regular visits between her and the children (see Matter of Jada Ta–Toneyia L., 66 A.D.3d 901, 902, 886 N.Y.S.2d 640;Matter of Deajah Shabri T., 44 A.D.3d 1060 1061, 844 N.Y.S.2d 410;Matter of Distiny Angelina N., 18 A.D.3d 755, 756, 795 N.Y.S.2d 685).

Published on: February 8, 2015

Plaintiff Brings Motion to Dismiss Family Case

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, the Defendants bring this motion seeking to reargue and renew their prior motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211 and 327, which resulted in an order of this court denying the motion. The Plaintiff opposes the present motion. Before addressing the substance of the Defendants’ present motion it is worthwhile to review the nature of the underlying action, the Defendants’ prior motion and the claims made therein.

This is an action to recover monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to an equipment rental agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by the defendant corporation and the Plaintiff’s assignor, guaranteed by the Defendant, the President of the corporation for the lease of telecommunication equipment and services.

Published on: October 25, 2014

Court Listens to Two Child Neglect Proceedings

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that in two related child neglect proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act, the appellant father appeals from so much of an order of the Family Court as denied his motion to vacate a fact-finding order of the same court, made upon his default in appearing at a fact-finding hearing, finding that he had neglected the subject children, and, in effect, to vacate an order of disposition of the same court, which, upon the fact-finding order, directed the release of the subject children to the mother’s custody and directed him to complete, inter alia, domestic violence counseling.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said the order dated July 7, 2011, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, the appellant’s motion to vacate the fact-finding order and, in effect, to vacate the order of disposition is granted, the fact-finding order and order of disposition are vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court for a new fact-finding hearing, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing; and it is further, ordered that, upon remittal, the Family Court shall forthwith make an order with regard to the custody of the subject children pending the new hearing or hearings and determination.

A Queens Family Lawyer said these proceedings were commenced pursuant to Family Court Act upon the filing of two petitions, in which it was alleged that the appellant father was a person legally responsible for the care of two female children, and that these children were neglected by him. The petitions were based on a single incident, in which it was alleged that the appellant, among other things, grabbed one of the subject children on the side of her neck.

Published on: October 11, 2014

Father Seeks to Modify Restraining Order Against Him

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 and Domestic Relations Law article 5-A (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act), the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, which, without a hearing, dismissed without prejudice his petition, in effect, for a modification of an order of protection of the Superior Court of the State of California, Alameda County, which, after a hearing, inter alia, directed him to stay away from the mother and the parties’ three children for a period of five years.

A Nassau County Family lawyer said that the mother and the father lived together in New York for approximately 14 years, without marrying. They have two daughters and a son. Thereafter, the mother took the children to California, allegedly to escape physical and emotional abuse by the father. Later on, the father filed a petition in Family Court, Nassau County, seeking custody of the parties’ two daughters. The parties’ teenage son returned to New York to reside with the father.

Thereafter, a New York Divorce Lawyer said the mother filed a “request for order” in the Superior Court of California, Alameda County (hereinafter the California court), seeking an order of protection against the father, and in favor of herself and the three children. In the California court, she also filed a request for custody of the children. In her papers, the mother informed the California court of the pending custody proceeding in New York. Nonetheless, the California court failed to communicate with the Family Court.

Published on: September 27, 2014

Father Claims Ex-Wife Willfully Prevented him from Exercising Visitation Rights

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said a man sought an order to have his former wife held in contempt for her willful and deliberate failure to comply with the stipulation of settlement, in that he allegedly interfered with his right to frequent and regular visitation with and telephone access to his children and by alienating the children from him through numerous acts of disparaging.

The court then granted the man’s motion by its amended decision and order, to the extent that a hearing was ordered. The contempt hearing was held with set schedules.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said the parties’ stipulation was incorporated but not merged into the parties’ decision of divorce. Pursuant to the unequivocal terms of the stipulation, the woman was prohibited from alienating the children from the her former husband, placing any obstacle in the way of the maintenance, love and affection of the children for the man, or to hinder, impair or prevent the growth of a close relationship between the children and their parents, respectively, or cause others to do so. Moreover, in sharing joint legal custody of the children, the woman was specifically required to consult with the man regarding decisions affecting the children’s education, health and religion.