Long Island

Published on: September 22, 2014

Appeals Court Decides if Trial Court Erred in Terminating Parental Rights

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to adjudicate the subject child to be a permanently neglected child and to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the Nassau County Department of Social Services appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, entered August 6, 1992, which, after a fact-finding hearing, dismissed the petition, without prejudice to renewal.

A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, the appellant contends that the fact-finding hearing amply supports a finding of permanent neglect, that it made diligent attempts to strengthen the parent-child relationship, and that, despite its encouragement, the mother, who is the respondent on this appeal, failed to maintain continuous contact with her son on a regular basis and has failed to plan for the future of the child. A Nassau Family Lawyer said that, the child in question is mentally retarded and suffers from cerebral palsy and ataxia. A neglect finding was entered against the mother, and the child was placed in the custody of the father. Several months later, the child suffered a broken leg while under the care and supervision of the father’s friend, and he was then placed in foster care on June 21, 1985. Since that time, due to his multiple handicaps, the child has been placed into six different foster homes.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said the issue in this case is whether the court erred in dismissing the petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother of the subject child.

Published on: August 31, 2014

Court Revisits Custody and Visitation Rights in Divorce Case

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in March 29, 1973, an order from the Family Court awarding custody of the child of the parties to respondent and granting visitation rights to the petitioner was entered and appealed by the latter. Consequently, the said order was reversed and the custody of the child was awarded to the mother, the petitioner. For the determination of visitation rights to be granted to the respondents, the proceeding was remitted to the Family Court.

It has been ruled that the custody of this child of tender years has been in the mother pursuant to a separation agreement which became incorporated into a foreign decree of divorce in 1969. The Family Court specifically found the mother not to be unfit.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said the Court have reviewed the record and found that the mother is neither unfit nor less fit than the father. Under these circumstances, it was error for the Family Court to change custody to the father.

Published on: August 9, 2014

Petitioner Moves for Suspension of Child Support Payments

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that sometime in October of 1968, a separation agreement was entered into by the parties (husband and wife), the terms of which were subsequently incorporated into a divorce decree granted and entered in Mexico. The agreement gave the mother, the respondent, custody of the children of the marriage and ordered the petitioner to provide support for their son, S, in the amount of $30 per week with visitation rights. Thereafter, on petitioner’s motion to compel visitation, the court by order entered 15 February 1977 granted petitioner specific revised rights of visitation with S.

Since the date of entry of the order of 15 February 1977, petitioner alleges that: he has been permitted to visit S only five times and has not been permitted to see him at all for the past five years; on his last attempt to see S, respondent’s husband told him S did not want to see him and ordered him to leave; in 1979, he discovered that S ceased using his surname, he had taken that of his stepfather and he has been known by that name since 1976.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that subsequently, petitioner moves pursuant to § 241 of the Domestic Relations Law for the suspension of the provision in the judgment of divorce for the support of the parties’ eighteen year-old son.

Published on: August 7, 2014

Court Rules in Paternity Suit

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said this proceeding before the court is a petition by X for an order declaring him to be the father of PJ who was born on 16 July 1999 and for an order setting his child support obligation. A, the child’s mother, opposes the petition. B, married to A at the time of PJ’s conception and birth and continues to be married to her today, also opposes the paternity petition. The Attorney for the Child also opposes the paternity petition.

On 7 January 2004, X filed his petition. At around this time, PJ was four-and-a-half years old. For a variety of reasons not having anything to do with X, the case took an inordinately long time to conclude. A and B together successfully evaded service for more than 19 months. When the Magistrate learned that A was married when PJ was born, she added B as a necessary party, issued a summons for him to appear. The court referred the matter to a judge to address the issues of equitable estoppel and presumption of legitimacy.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said X and his sister, M, testified in favor of X’s petition. A and B testified in opposition to the petition and in support of their affirmative defenses of the presumption of legitimacy and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Having considered the evidence and had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Published on: August 5, 2014

Court Looks at Whether Respondent may be Subject of a Summary Licensee Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in January of 1989, the petitioner purchased a premises known as Pine brook Avenue, New York. A certified copy of the deed to the premises was offered into evidence, although the respondent concedes that her name does not appear on the deed or mortgage. The monthly mortgage payment for the premises at issue is $1,350 per month. In April of 1994, the parties had a child out of wedlock. In December of 1997, the respondent and the parties’ minor child moved into the subject premises with the petitioner. At the time that the respondent moved into the premises in question, there was no written agreement between the parties with regard to the subject premises and the respondent was not married to the petitioner. However, the parties were involved in a relationship, as boyfriend and girlfriend, and had been involved for some time. In July of 1999, the parties’ second child was born out of wedlock. Sometime after the birth of the parties’ second child, in early 2000, the relationship between the parties failed.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, soon thereafter, the respondent brought a Family Court proceeding for child support of the parties’ two minor children. As a result of this proceeding, a Family Court order of support was issued. In May of 2000, the respondent commenced another Family Court proceeding. This proceeding was to obtain a protective order. On December 1, 2000, an order of protection was ordered by the Nassau County Family Court, in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner, upon default of the petitioner. Shortly after the order of protection was issued, the petitioner demanded that the respondent leave the premises.

A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, in December of 2000, the petitioner served the respondent a 10-day notice to vacate the premises. In January of 2001, the petitioner commenced a holdover proceeding to obtain exclusive possession of the premises in question, on the ground that the respondent is a “licensee” whose license has been terminated by the proper notice and service under RPAPL 713 (7). The respondent waived any defects in the 10-day notice, the petition and any jurisdictional defects. At the commencement of this proceeding there was no child support or custody order in effect. The order of protection, however, was in effect.

Published on: August 1, 2014

Husband Seeks a Downward Modification of Child Support

by Stephen Bilkis

New York Family Lawyer said in accordance with a separation agreement, the husband was obligated to pay $750 per month to the wife as child support for the two infant of their marriage. The couple was granted a conversion divorce and the separation agreement was incorporated but not merged into the judgment.

In February 1985 the husband moved in Nassau County Supreme Court for a downward modification of child support and the wife moved in the same court for enforcement of the judgment and arrears. In settlement of both motions, a so ordered stipulation was entered in Nassau County Supreme Court which determined an allocation of the proceeds upon the sale of the marital premises. The stipulation was read into the record and commenced that both of the proceedings presently before the Court based upon the wife’s application seeking various forms of enforcement relief against the husband, and husband’s application for a downward modification of child support obligation are hereby settled on terms and conditions. It is noted that, pursuant to the terms of the stipulation and settlement, the former marital residence was sold and the husband received the sum of approximately $50,000 from the proceeds, the wife received in excess of $100,000 and the sum of $38,000 was placed in an escrow account to secure the future payment of child support.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said in August 28, 1985, the husband again sought to reduce his child support payments, this https://familylawyer.1800nynylaw.com/new-york-divorce-lawyer.htmltime in the Family Court of Nassau County, and the matter was referred to a Hearing Examiner.

Published on: July 29, 2014

Court Discusses Concept of Equitable Estoppel

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said a man and a woman appeared for conference before the Support Magistrate when the respondent man requested genetic testing be conducted before admitting to paternity of the children. The court file reflects that the man told the Support Magistrate that, although the children refer to him as dad, he is requesting genetic testing because he would like to be sure. The Support Magistrate then assigned a Law Guardian, and the matter was adjourned for further proceedings.

On the adjourned date, the court file shows that the Law Guardian advised the Support Magistrate that the children recognize the man to be their father and that he spent holidays with them. The man renewed his request for genetic testing before admitting to paternity. The matter was referred to the Family Court for determination as to whether the petitioner woman could invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the man’s request for genetic testing.

The court then set a schedule for submission of papers on the issue. The woman filed a notice of motion requesting that an order be made estopping the man, pursuant to Family Court Act from obtaining genetic testing to disprove paternity of the children.

Published on: July 26, 2014

Court Decides Disposition of Family Residence

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in a matrimonial action in which the plaintiff wife had previously been granted a divorce, the defendant husband appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated August 25, 1981, which granted plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of a receiver of all defendant’s property in the State of New York, “particularly all of his right, title and interest in and to the former marital residence”, named plaintiff as the receiver, awarded plaintiff a counsel fee of $750, and denied defendant’s cross motion to, inter alia, suspend prospective payments of alimony and child support, on the ground that plaintiff unreasonably withheld visitation, and (2) from a further order of the same court, dated October 22, 1981, which denied his motion to renew.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said in a stipulation settling their differences, which was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce, the parties agreed, inter alia, that plaintiff would have exclusive possession of the marital residence, owned by them as tenants by the entirety. However, plaintiff was given the right to elect to sell the marital residence. The defendant further agreed to pay plaintiff $50 per week alimony and a total of $100 per week child support. The stipulation also provided: “Each party shall own free of any claim or right of the other all of the items of property, real, personal and mixed, of any kind, nature or description, and wheresoever’s situated, which are now owned by him or her”.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, in January, 1981, defendant petitioned the Family Court, Nassau County, for an order suspending his child support obligations on the ground that plaintiff had unreasonably denied him visitation with the children. By order dated January 28, 1981, his application was denied. A Nassau Visitation Lawyer said that, in June, 1981, defendant made a second application in the Family Court, Nassau County, for suspension of alimony and/or maintenance, on the ground, inter alia, that he was unreasonably denied visitation. By order dated July 17, 1981, his application was, again, denied and a judgment for arrears was entered against him.

Published on: June 9, 2014

Paintiff Requests Order Removing Spouse from the Home

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in an action for divorce, plaintiff wife has made two applications for orders directing defendant to vacate the marital home; to provide support and maintenance for her and the issue of the marriage; and to restrain him from removing furnishings, furniture and personal property from the residence.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said when the motions were originally submitted, the Court discovered that an application which had been made to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for an order of protection was being sent to the Court in Nassau County for determination. An inquiry to the Nassau County Family Court confirmed that information. Since the motions concerned ‘relief associated with the Family Court proceeding’, the Court referred them to that Court for hearing and determination. Then the applications were referred back to the Family Court in Suffolk County. In June 1971, a Judge of that Court, after a discussion with counsel, returned the matters to the Court for determination. The Court have received and carefully reviewed the transcript of the remarks made on that occasion.

A Long Island Family Lawyer said that referral of these motions was not made without authority nor was it intended to enlarge the Family Court’s jurisdiction. That Court has original jurisdiction over support proceedings and the applications for support and custody in matrimonial actions referred to it by this Court. The Family Court Act, recognizing the obvious, i.e., that a husband is chargeable with the support of his wife and a father is obligated to support his children, authorized the Family Court to require him to provide for their support as that court might determine. Furthermore, the Family Court may make an allowance for counsel fees in proceedings seeking support for the wife and children. In actions for divorce, separation or annulment, the Supreme Court on its own motion may refer to the Family Court applications for temporary support or temporary or permanent custody.

Published on: May 20, 2014

Plaintiff Seeks to Convert Judgment from Dominican Republic to New York

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in a proceeding to convert a judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic to a New York judgment, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which denied her application for leave to file the judgment from the Dominican Republic as a New York judgment.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the plaintiff commenced an action for a divorce in the Supreme Court, New York County. She and the defendant subsequently entered into a separation agreement, which, among other things, provided for child support for their three children.

After the separation agreement was signed, the parties apparently decided against pursuing the New York County matrimonial action any further. With the plaintiff’s consent, the defendant went to the Dominican Republic and obtained a bilateral judgment of divorce. This judgment recited that the parties expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic. The New York separation agreement was incorporated by reference, but not merged, in the judgment.