Nassau County

Published on: December 10, 2015

Court Looks at Terms of Bond Held by Department of Social Services

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an action by plaintiff, as mortgagor, of her premises at New York for a judicial declaration regarding the terms of a bond and mortgage signed October 28, 1966.

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that the terms of this bond and mortgage should be limited to the amount of $7,500.00. The Department of Social Services as current holder of the bond and mortgage is seeking an amount in excess of $36,000.00 pursuant to plaintiff’s having received such payments for the support of herself and her family as a recipient of the Aid to Dependent Children program.

Published on: November 18, 2015

Court Rules on Petitioner’s Request for Tax Exempt Status

by Stephen Bilkis

The issue here is whether renewal applications for four properties located in the Village of Freeport, Nassau County, are entitled to tax exemption pursuant to Real Property Tax Law § 462. We affirm the order of the Appellate Division holding that the properties are tax exempt.

On September 24, 1999, respondent, Word of Life Ministries, submitted to Nassau County renewal applications for tax exempt status for four properties on the ground that they were used as residences by “officiating clergymen.” The applications mistakenly answered “yes” in response to the question whether the properties were used for purposes other than as residences of “the officiating clergy” stating that they were used as the residences of assistant pastors. Before the tax authorities made a decision, respondent corrected the applications before the County to state that the properties were used as residences for officiating clergymen. After reviewing the applications, Nassau County concluded that the properties were not tax exempt under RPTL 462. Respondent submitted similar applications to the Village of Freeport on July 25, 2000, but the Village rejected respondent’s attempt to correct its mistake. These applications were denied on or about August 15, 2000.

Published on: November 17, 2015

Plaintiff Brings Case Regarding Collateral Estoppel

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendants contend the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable and would warrant a dismissal of these proceedings. On or about June 22, 1969, five youths were arraigned upon a complaint in the First District Court, Nassau County, New York, charged with violation of New York State Penal Law § 105.10 in that on June 21, 1969 at about 3:45 P.M. near the Southern State Parkway and Corona Avenue in North Valley Stream, Nassau County, New York, ‘the said defendants and each of them and each acting in concert with and aided and abetted by each other, with intent that conduct constituting a felony be performed did each agree with the other to engage in or cause performance of such conduct, to wit: the said defendants with the intent to violate § 130.35 of the Penal Law of the State of New York when by forcible compulsion they engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant.’

Four of the youths were subsequently indicted by the Nassau County Grand Jury on July 16, 1969 for the crimes of Rape in the First Degree (P.L. § 130.35) and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree (P.L. § 130.65) and arraigned in the Nassau County Court under indictment number 27613. The fifth boy was less than 16 years of age at the time of the alleged criminal acts and was charged with being a juvenile delinquent in the Family Court of Nassau County under Article 7 of the New York State Family Court Act.

Published on: November 16, 2015

Plaintiff Brings Motion to Renew Prior Motion to Dismiss

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, the Defendants bring this motion seeking to reargue and renew their prior motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211 and 327, which resulted in an order of this court denying the motion. The Plaintiff opposes the present motion. Before addressing the substance of the Defendants’ present motion it is worthwhile to review the nature of the underlying action, the Defendants’ prior motion and the claims made therein. A Nassau County lawyer said that this is an action to recover monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to an equipment rental agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by the defendant corporation and the Plaintiff’s assignor, guaranteed by the Defendant, the President of the corporation for the lease of telecommunication equipment and services.

This is an action to recover monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to an equipment rental agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by the defendant corporation and the Plaintiff’s assignor, guaranteed by the Defendant, the President of the corporation for the lease of telecommunication equipment and services.

Published on: November 15, 2015

Motion Brought By Social Services Request DNA Testing

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a case where a motion was brought by the Deputy County Attorney’s Office, on behalf of the Nassau County Department of Social Services, seeking to have the Court direct the respondent to submit to DNA testing for the purpose of establishing paternity of the subject child. Both the respondent and law guardian submitted opposition papers invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel, arguing that the child has an intact father-child relationship with another individual.

This matter was initiated when the Department filed a petition for paternity and support against respondent. The Magistrate presided, and referred the matter to this Court once the issue of equitable estoppel was raised.

Published on: November 14, 2015

Court Weighs in on Reasonable Certainty Standard Regarding Evidence

by Stephen Bilkis

The instant appeal provides us with an occasion to discuss in detail the “reasonable certainty” evidentiary standard of CPLR 4545 (c) that governs collateral source hearings, as decisional authority on the subject is sparse.

During the early morning hours of a rainy January 13, 1995, the plaintiff MK was riding in the front passenger seat of a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant KOP. As KOP proceeded along Quaker Meeting House Road in Farmingdale at approximately 30 miles per hour, the car hydroplaned off the road and crashed into a tree, causing MK to sustain fractures to her ankle and C2 vertebra. Subsequently, MK commenced this action against KOP, as well as the defendant County of Nassau, alleging as the bases for recovery KOP’s negligent operation of the vehicle and the County’s negligent road design. Prior to trial, in an order dated August 26, 2004, the Supreme Court determined that the County was collaterally estopped from arguing that the road was not negligently designed based upon prior decisions of this Court in Furino v County of Nassau and Zawacki v County of Nassau. After a trial on the issue of liability, the jury found, on October 21, 2004, that the negligence of both KOP and the County were substantial factors contributing to the accident’s occurrence, and apportioned 13% of fault to KOP and 87% of fault to the County.

Published on: October 8, 2015

Respondent Contends Evidence Used Against Him was Incorrect

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appeal by defendant from: (1) a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered August 15, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of (felony) murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and of grand larceny and assault (both in the second degree), and after a jury recommendation, imposing sentence of life imprisonment on the conviction of murder in the first degree; and (2) from ‘each and every intermediate order’ made in the action.

After the crimes were committed, the defendant fled to California, where he was arrested and searched. Immediately after the arrest, the California police searched and found two revolvers in the automobile which the defendant had rented.

Published on: October 6, 2015

Judge Decides Case Where Child is Hurt at a Family Camp Out

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a family case brought about during a school camping, then nine-year old child, sustained personal injuries at the Park while playing tag with some 15 fellow campers. The campers were waiting to be picked up at the conclusion of the camp day and were playing tag, as they often did, in a dedicated playground area which also contained a large outdoor play system or “Jungle Gym” comprised of interconnected and elevated walkways, bridges, ramps and ladders.

A witness testified that the tag games was generally conducted on the Jungle Gym – after the game had been ongoing for some thirty minutes, another camper began to chase after him in order to tag him. In an effort to escape, he ran “really fast” towards the Jungle Gym and then ran to an elevated bridge pathway on the equipment, bordered on both sides by a rail fence. He then climbed onto and/or mounted the top of the fence, which was capped by a horizontal rail, and secured himself by gripping the rail with his hands, allowing his legs to dangle freely below.

The witness allegedly sat on the fence in this fashion, “for like ten minutes” because, as he explained, the camper who was attempting to tag him waited “a really long time” anticipating that he might jump. Although the chasing camper ultimately departed and attempted to tag another person, Frank’s hands eventually got “sweaty” and he lost his grip and fell, causing him to strike the ground several feet below and sustain personal injuries, including two fractured wrists.

Published on: October 5, 2015

Administrator of Children’s Services Brings Suit Regarding Placement of Child

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding under Family Court Act article 10, the New York City Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the Administration for Children’s Services, seeks leave of the court to allow the respondent’s placement with the Commissioner of Social Services [CSS] to lapse, in light of the respondent’s placement with the New York State Division for Youth [DFY].

This court placed the respondent, now fourteen years old, with CSS on October 22, 1991. The Commissioner of Social Services brought a neglect proceeding against the respondent’s father, after the father left respondent in the care of a girlfriend without making any provision for the child’s care. Respondent’s mother died in 1987. CSS worked with the father for the respondent’s return to his care for four years, during which time the father intermittently was incarcerated. In the summer of 1995, the 13 year old respondent ran away from foster care and took up residence with his father.

Published on: September 20, 2015

Defendant Claims Lack of Jurisdiction in Court Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 210.20(1)(e) and (h), to dismiss the fourth count of the captioned indictment. In support, he presses two grounds. First, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over that charge of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. Next, he maintains that trial of this count would constitute double jeopardy in any event.

The court has extensively examined all relevant federal and state constitutional provisions, sections of the Penal Law, Judiciary Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, and case law. Upon that review, it is not convinced that dismissal is warranted on either ground urged by the defense. However, for the reasons set forth below, count four of the indictment is dismissed in the interest of justice. CPL 210.20(1)(i).