Articles Posted in Nassau County

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The defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 210.20(1)(e) and (h), to dismiss the fourth count of the captioned indictment. In support, he presses two grounds. First, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over that charge of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. Next, he maintains that trial of this count would constitute double jeopardy in any event.

The court has extensively examined all relevant federal and state constitutional provisions, sections of the Penal Law, Judiciary Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, and case law. Upon that review, it is not convinced that dismissal is warranted on either ground urged by the defense. However, for the reasons set forth below, count four of the indictment is dismissed in the interest of justice. CPL 210.20(1)(i).

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In this proceeding, petitioner moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting summary judgment: (1) converting the QTIP trust to a unitrust; (2) compelling the sale of the family business interests for fair market value; (3) removing the decedent’s sister as co-trustee and requiring her to file her account; and (4) disqualifying the decedent’s father as successor co-trustee and immediately appointing an independent corporate fiduciary to succeed as co-trustee. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied, except to the extent that Deborah is directed to file an intermediate account of her acts as co-trustee of the QTIP trust as set forth below.

The decedent died testate on December 7, 2001, leaving his wife, who is now forty-six years old, and two children, who are now twenty and nineteen, respectively. Petitioner and the decedent’s sister are sisters-in-law, the latter having been decedent’s sister. Apparently, the close family relationship that existed between petitioner and the family while decedent was alive has deteriorated.

The decedent’s last will and testament dated October 28, 1998 was admitted to probate by this court in April 2002. Letters testamentary and letters of trusteeship for the QTIP trust established in the will were granted on the same date to the sister and the wife. They qualified as such and have acted and are still acting in those capacities.

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In this private placement adoption the natural mother of the subject child, born on October 21, 1976, and her husband, the alleged father, by order to show cause dated November 17, 1977 request an order: (1) vacating and setting aside the natural mother’s consent to the subject child’s adoption; (2) dismissing the adoption proceeding filed by the respondents; (3) requesting the court to determine the custody of the child; and (4) directing the respondents to deliver the subject child to the petitioners.

Following extensive and protracted pre-trial discovery by all parties, testimony was heard by Surrogate for 16 days commencing November 17, 1978 and concluding on July 1, 1980. The transcript is in excess of 2,100 pages with 23 exhibits in evidence. During the course of the discovery and hearing, the court rendered 8 decisions, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the court to represent the interests of the child filed 3 interim and 1 final report. On July 31, 1980, before he could render a decision, Surrogate retired, which requires this court to render a decision on a bitterly contested matter which it did not hear.

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Petitioners/plaintiffs commenced this hybrid proceeding/class action in June 2006, challenging reductions in their food stamp benefits. The reductions were made pursuant to a pilot project entitled the Group Home Standardized Benefit Program (“GHSBP”), instituted by Respondent/Defendant who is the Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”) of the New York State Department of Family Assistance.

In the course of the proceedings herein, Plaintiffs were granted partial summary judgment on their claim that the State Defendant’s implementation of GHSBP violated the state constitutional and statutory rulemaking requirements, Intervenor was granted leave to intervene, the application for certification of the Plaintiff class was denied, and the State Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied. By decision and order dated May 19, 2009, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the denial of class certification and identified the Plaintiff class as “consisting of all recipients of food stamps in the State of New York whose food stamp benefits were determined and reduced under the Group Home Standardized Benefit Program and whose monthly income included payments of Supplemental Security Income benefits.

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A motion (seq. No. 1) by the attorney for the petitioner for an order pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to compel the County Respondents to reduce petitioners’ total assessments on the April 2006 final roll by applying RPTL § 1805 assessment limitations and caps, and defining “assessment” as full property value-or-if a lower total assessment reduction results, to apply RPTL § 1805 assessment limitations to the parcel’s land assessment, and defining “assessment” as the full property value and “land assessment” as the full land value; to compel respondents, when applying RPTL § 1805 assessment limitations, to use an assessment as reduced by judicial review as the “previous year’s” assessment; and to compel Nassau County to pay refunds for any overpaid tax bills is determined as hereinafter set forth and adjourned suasponte to November 15, 2007. Cross-motion (seq. No. 2) by the attorney for the respondents for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) and CPLR 3211(a) (7) dismissing petitioners’ Article 78 proceeding is denied.

The petitioners bring the within Article 78 proceeding for a judgment declaring that the alleged disparate treatment of petitioners’ class one property compared to class two and four properties with respect to lowering the level of assessment to avoid the application of RPTL § 1805 constitutes a violation of the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions and petitioners are entitled to a refund from Nassau County for any overpaid tax bills.

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I. Matter of St. Francis hospital, as attorney-in-fact for JL.

For approximately two weeks in May, 1977, JL was a patient at St. Francis Hospital. He incurred a bill of $4,794.90 and applied for medical assistance. The Nassau County Department of Social Services, however, declared him ineligible and his application was denied. He appealed the denial and, after a fair hearing which he attended along with an attorney retained by the hospital, the State Department of Social Services affirmed the determination of the local agency.

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The defendant moves for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s verified complaint as there exists no triable issue of material fact with respect to the defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. The plaintiff cross moves for an order pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) granting the plaintiff leave to amend the verified complaint to plead with further clarification the relationship between the defendant and the Old Brookville Police Department, and an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment. Both parties oppose the other party’s motion. The plaintiff seeks damages in the underlying action for personal and emotional injuries sustained on August 2, 2005, incident to the plaintiff’s alleged false arrest and false imprisonment by the Old Brookville Police Department.

On August 2, 2005, the plaintiff resided with his wife at their home in Old Brockville. The couple were in the midst of a divorce, and the wife filed a petition in the Nassau County Family Court, under docket number 8265/05, dated July 29, 2005. The wife sought an order of protection against the plaintiff husband in that Family Court proceeding, and the Court issued an order of protection dated November 23, 2005, to wit ordering the plaintiff, date of birth January 1, 1942, to observe the following conditions of behavior: refrain from assault, stalking, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, disorderly conduct, intimidation, threats or any criminal offense against the petitioner, date of birth December 5, 1961, wherever the petitioner may be; observe such other conditions as are necessary to further the purposes of protection: the respondent husband to stay away from the petitioner’s bedroom. The Family Court directed the order of protection against the respondent husband remain in effect up to and including May 22, 2006. On August 2, 2005, at approximately 12:20 p.m.

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In a case, it is alleged that on or about March 12, 2005, at about 5:00 PM, at x New York, Nassau County, State of New York, the respondent engaged in conduct, which if engaged in by a person sixteen (16) years of age or older, would constitute the crimes of Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law §130.50(3), a class B Felony; Attempted Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law §§110/130.50.(3), a class C Felony; Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law §130.65(3), a class D Felony; Attempted Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law §§110/130.65(3), a class E Felony; and Endangering the Welfare of a Child, in violation of Penal Law § 260.10(1), a class A Misdemeanor.

A Nassau County family lawyer said that the respondent engaged and/or attempted to engage in oral sexual conduct with another person who is less than eleven years old; in that respondent put his mouth on the complainant’s penis. The complainant is six years old.

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The matter currently before the Court is a motion by the petitioner to have the Court appointed attorney for the child relieved of her duties. The petitioner brought the motion pro se. The subject child of the motion, was appointed law guardian for the child and submitted an affirmation in opposition. The Nassau County Legal Aid Society was appointed to represent the respondent. However, it does not appear as if the petitioner had the respondent served with her motion.

The underlying petitions in this matter were family offense petitions filed by the petitioner against the paternal uncle and the father. The petitions alleged that the uncle sexually abused the subject child, then three years old. The allegations against the respondent-father were that, in light of the fact that he lived in the same home as the seventeen year old uncle, he allowed the abuse to happen.

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In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Assessors of the County of Nassau dated January 5, 1998, which granted the application of the respondent Temple for a renewal of a tax exemption pursuant to Real Property and Tax Law § 420-a for the 1998-1999 school tax year and the 1999 general tax year, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which, upon granting the cross motion of the respondent Temple to dismiss the proceeding, dismissed the proceeding.

The petitioners sought review of a determination of the Board of Assessors of the County of Nassau (hereinafter the Board) that the Temple (hereinafter the Temple), a religious organization chartered in the State of California, was exempt from real estate taxes on its property in Old Westbury, Nassau County. The Supreme Court granted the cross motion of the Temple to dismiss this proceeding finding that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge the Board’s determination and the Board’s determination was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational.

The courts have held that taxpayers in a community have standing to challenge an agency’s determination that a property within the community’s borders is exempted from the tax rolls. The decrease in the tax base that occurs when a property is improperly exempted from taxation has been found to constitute a cognizable injury to such taxpayers. Thus, the Supreme Court erred when it found that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge the instant exemption.

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