Nassau County

Published on: March 3, 2014

Court Decides Case Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, based upon the foregoing papers, defendant (Father) moves for a suspension and downward modification of his child support obligations on the ground that plaintiff (Mother) allegedly has refused his visitation with the parties’ daughter, has removed the child to another jurisdiction without court approval or notice to Father and has failed to provide him with an address, telephone number or e-mail address for the child. He further moves for an order directing a change of custody and/or immediate visitation with the child.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that, the mother cross-moves for dismissal of Father’s application on the grounds that: (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the instant motion, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-a (1) (b), since neither the parties nor the child resided within the state of New York on the filing date of the subject application or six months prior to same; and (2) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the child and her mother, the plaintiff, had no significant connection with the State of New York on the filing date of the instant application and for six months prior to such filing, and, in addition, substantial evidence is no longer available in the State of New York concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships. Plaintiff also moves, alternatively, for an order whereby the court declines jurisdiction over the instant custody/visitation dispute on the ground that New York is an inconvenient forum and a declaration that the province of Ontario, Canada is the appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. The parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment of divorce which was granted upon Father’s default on May 10, 2006.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said that, in support of his instant motion, Father submits an affidavit wherein he states the following, in relevant part, concerning the background of the subject custody/visitation dispute between the parties and the current custody/residential arrangements for the child. In support of her cross motion, Mother states that the subject judgment of divorce was obtained upon the default of Father. He was served by Mother with all divorce documents in Santa Clara, California, after he was located there by private investigators retained by Mother. He commenced his own action for divorce against Mother on June 27, 2005, but thereafter did not prosecute such action. A Kings Divorce Lawyer said that, in further support of his motion and in opposition to Mother’s cross motion, Father submits an affidavit.

Published on: March 2, 2014

Court Discusses Guardians’s Motion to Dismiss

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, the petition in this matter was filed on or about May 14, 1991 in Westchester County Family Court and on July 18, 1991 a fact-finding hearing was held. Thereafter the Court entered a finding that the respondent committed an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of Assault in the Third Degree under Penal Law § 120.00(1) which is a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to § 302.3(4) of the Family Court Act [hereinafter cited as “FCA”] the Judge in Westchester County ordered the proceeding transferred to the Family Court of Kings County for further action, and released the respondent to the custody of her mother pending the dispositional hearing.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that, on August 26, 1991 the case arrived in Kings County from Westchester County. On August 27, 1991, the case appeared on the court’s calendar and a summons was issued for the respondent. The respondent appeared with her mother on the return date, September 23, 1991, and a new law guardian was assigned, as the attorney who represented the respondent in Westchester County was discharged at the conclusion of the fact-finding. The Court ordered a probation investigation, pursuant to FCA § 351.1(2) and adjourned the case to October 30, 1991. On October 30, 1991 the law guardian requested time to submit a written motion dismissing the proceeding, and whatever rights the respondent may have had to a “speedy disposition” were waived by the respondent’s attorney at that time in order to prepare the motion.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said that, the law guardian asks the Court to dismiss the petition, pursuant to FCA § 350.1(2), which provides that in all cases where the respondent is not detained, “the dispositional hearing shall commence not more than fifty days after entry of an order [fact-finding] pursuant to FCA § 345.1.” Respondent argues that the time from which to measure the fifty days begins on August 5, 1991 when the Westchester court entered the fact-finding order. Therefore the Court was required to conduct a dispositional hearing before September 24, 1991. When the case was adjourned from September 23, 1991 to October 30, 1991, that adjournment exceeded the fifty days provided for in the statute, and since the Kings County court made no finding of “good cause” or “special circumstances,” pursuant to FCA § 350.1 (3) or (5) to warrant an adjournment beyond the fiftieth day, the case must be dismissed for failure to provide the respondent with a “speedy disposition.”

Published on: February 24, 2014

Court Decides Child Neglect Matter

by Stephen Bilkis

An institution moved to request a decision without a hearing for a child neglect matter. The complainant requested the court to enter a finding of derivative neglect against the mother of the child based on the court’s prior finding of neglect as to the offender’s older children.

A New York Family Lawyer said that in support of the motion, the complainant stated that the derivative neglect appeal was filed in close proximity to the finding of the recent child neglect issue and the condition of the mother’s faulty parenting continued to exist.

Subsequently, the child’s attorney stated that the mother had accepted services and did not exhibit such an impaired level of parental decision as to create a substantial risk of harm to the child, and therefore, the complainant had not met its argument for derivative neglect.

Published on: December 22, 2013

Court Decides on Executor’s Accounting

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, before the court is the first and final account of the Public Administrator of Nassau County for the estate of the decedent who died intestate, a resident of Great Neck, New York, on August 8, 2006. Letters of administration issued to the Public Administrator on April 19, 2007; the petition and account were initially filed on November 6, 2009. The petition identifies a combined total of 29 alleged maternal and paternal first cousins. A guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent the interests of decedent’s missing or unknown distributees. Kinship hearings were conducted before a referee on September 23, 2010 and November 16, 2010. Over 130 exhibits were admitted into evidence at the hearings, and an additional 14 exhibits were admitted after the hearing on the consents of counsel and the guardian ad litem. Testimony was taken from a professional genealogist and several members of decedent’s family, both blood relatives and those related by marriage.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that, the account as filed shows total charges of $830,114.16, and total credits of $123,505.94. The account was filed in November 2009 and must be brought current. The executor seeks approval of the accounting, approval of commissions, the fixing of fees for the services of the attorney and accountant. In addition, the court must address the outcome of the two kinship hearings, set the fee for the guardian ad litem and release the administrator from the surety bond.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said that, the testimony at the kinship hearings and the exhibits admitted into evidence are testament to the extraordinary efforts expended by counsel to the Public Administrator, the genealogist, and the attorney for the claimants to identify all of the heirs of this very extended and extraordinary family. The court notes that the family tree prepared for the paternal side of the decedent’s family is nearly seven feet in length; the family tree for the maternal side is over ten feet in length. The court will also take judicial notice that records of vital statistics in the 19th and early 20th centuries for African-American families in the Deep South, where decedent and many of her ancestors and other relatives were born, are often incomplete or non-existent.

Published on: November 15, 2013

Court Rules on Separation Agreement

by Stephen Bilkis

A petition to modify an order made by another court pursuant to the Family Court Act was filed in the County Family Court. The petitioner former husband of the respondent wife seeks sole child custody of his son.

A New York Family Lawyer said a decree of divorce was filed and entered. The decree was made by New York Supreme Court. The basis of jurisdiction for the decree was a separation agreement entered into between the parties in New York which had been adhered to by the parties for one year prior to the commencement of the divorce proceeding. The separation agreement entered into between the parties was filed in the County Clerk’s office. The terms of the separation agreement were incorporated, but not merged, in the decree of divorce.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said the divorce decree ordered that all matters arising in the future pertaining to the enforcement of this decree or to requested modifications of any provision thereof, whether pertaining to child support, visitation or child custody, be and the same hereby are referred to the County Family Court or the appropriate Family Court having jurisdiction of the matter.

Published on: October 26, 2013

Court Dissolution Involving Emancipated Children

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said this proceeding consolidates, only for purposes of decision, two matrimonial actions with similar facts. In both matrimonial actions, the court granted a Judgment of Divorce based on express sworn statement and Findings of fact that there were no children of the marriage. In both of those cases, the Court has discovered that there were unemancipated children of the marriages whose support was not provided for in the proposed or signed orders. Also, in both matrimonial actions, the parties are entangled in separate mortgage foreclosure lawsuits.

Based on the complaint, filed by Atty. IS on behalf of Ms. N.C., the parties were married in Haiti in 1992 and there were no children of the marriage. On 21 January 2010, the plaintiff signed a verification of the complaint notarized by her attorney, Atty. IS. There are two different summonses with notice. In one summons with notice, Atty. IS cautions the parties, inter alia, not to remove the children of the marriage from any medical, hospital, or dental plan.

A New York Custody Lawyer said the divorce action had been assigned to the Judge as an uncontested matrimonial not involving children. The Matrimonial Clerk’s Office made the assignment as such since the complaint filed by Atty. IS, signed by him, and verified by his client stated: “There are no children of the marriage.” The plaintiff, N.C., in her own affidavit, stated: “There are no children of the marriage: Not Applicable.” Her affidavit was signed and notarized on 14 September 2010, and the notary was her attorney, IS. The Findings of Fact also recited: “There are no children of this marriage.” These repeated statements turned out to be false.

Published on: October 19, 2013

Foster Mother Moves for Custody

by Stephen Bilkis

The child of herein parties was born in 1995, with a positive toxicology for cocaine. He was removed from his mother’s custody shortly after birth. Her parental rights were eventually terminated, as were the father’s in 1999. A New York Family Lawyer said both parents’ terminations were based on permanent neglect. During the time that the Department of Social Services (DSS) was providing services for the mother, the father was filing at least four custody proceedings. All of the father’s petitions were dismissed by the Family Court judge without a hearing. According to the trial court, the petitions were “dismissed due to [the father’s] unwillingness to partake in services recommended by [DSS].” For the years from 1995 to 1998, the father received one hour of DSS-supervised child visitation each week.

A New York Family attorney said that concerning the termination of parental rights finding, the Appellate Division held that DSS made no effort to satisfy its burden of showing that it had formulated a realistic plan that was tailored to fit the father’s circumstances. It also held that the Family Court judge “repeatedly thwarted the father’s efforts to establish the lack of any reasonable basis for the plan that was put in place. Obviously, the petition should have been dismissed at the conclusion of DSS’ case, if not earlier.” A New York Child Custody Lawyer said the Appellate Division, in finding that the Family Court judge had demonstrated hostility toward the father and his attorney, ordered that all further proceedings be conducted before a different judge.

Upon remand, the Court returned custody of the child to the father and entered a series of child visitation orders to facilitate the transition of the child back into the father’s home. During this period of time, the foster mother filed petitions seeking visitation and custody rights to the child. The Court rejected the foster mother’s claims. It found that there was no statutory, common law or constitutional basis to grant child visitation to a nonbiological, former custodian. The Court reserved on the question of whether the child has an independent constitutional right to seek visitation with his former foster mother and allowed the parties and the Law Guardian time to brief the issue. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said this decision answers that question in the affirmative. From the child’s birth in 1995 until April 2000, when he was returned to his father, the boy had lived with the foster mother for all of his life but for a few weeks.

Published on: October 9, 2013

Court Discusses Statutory Duties of Law Guardian

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Order of protection case, the Law Guardian was relieved and new counsel assigned to represent the child’s interests. Respondent mother’s counsel asserts that during the fact-finding hearing, while the caseworker for the Administration for Children’s Services was testifying, the Law Guardian read a People/Us magazine under her desk and text messages on her cell phone. In addition, counsel for respondent mother notes that the Law Guardian asked the caseworker no questions during cross-examination. According to counsel for respondent mother, “the last straw” was during an off-the-record bench conference, when the Law Guardian stated her support for the agency’s position. A New York Family Lawyer said at that point, counsel contends that he became very upset, because the Law Guardian appeared to fail to pay attention to the testimony during the trial, yet took a position against his client.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the motion is opposed by the Law Guardian. She emphatically denies that she was reading a magazine, although she admits that there was one on her desk. She also denies that she was reading text messages asserting, “there is no cell phone service in the court.” The Law Guardian asserts that she has diligently represented her now five-year-old client’s interests. Specifically, she asserts that she met with her client twice, conducted an extensive and thorough investigation and made a determination to advocate for a resolution that she believed to be in the child’s best interests. She asserts that although she did not wish to cross-examine the caseworker, she was paying very close attention and is knowledgeable about all of the facts and circumstances at issue in this case.

Counsel for respondent maternal great-grandmother has submitted an affirmation which essentially supports the observations of respondent mother’s counsel about the Law Guardian’s actions, although he takes no position in support of, or opposition to, the motion. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said after having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court finds the affirmation submitted by respondent mother’s counsel devoid of viable evidence indicating any bias on the part of the Law Guardian, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to diligently represent the child’s interests or other recognized grounds for disqualification. The motion is denied.

Published on: October 6, 2013

Court Discusses Dual Representation Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Plaintiff A is the court appointed article 81 financial guardian for B. He is also the co-trustee of the B Family Trust. A New York Family Lawyer said these appointments were made only after the original action was brought. A has now interposed a third amended complaint on behalf of his ward. Defendant C as trustee and certain business defendants have brought a pre-answer motion to dismiss the fifth through fourteenth causes of action asserted in the third amended complaint. C has now joined in that motion in her individual capacity. Defendant D has separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to her. Defendant E separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to him.

F law firm separately moved to be relieved as counsel of record for certain defendants. This motion has already been denied by the court. A cross moved to: disqualify the F law firm; appoint a receiver; appoint a successor trustee in place of C of the B Family Trust; hold a hearing on whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for G; strike D’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss and strike C’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss. A New York Custody Lawyer said that subsequently withdrew his application to have a receiver appointed. Although the parties represented to the court that the only relief left in the cross-motion pertained to disqualification of the F law firm, other requested relief has not been formally withdrawn. Thus, still outstanding is A’s request for the appointment of a successor trustee, a guardian ad litem hearing and to strike reply papers on the motions to dismiss.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said that because all of the motions and cross-motion are substantially interrelated and rely on similar facts and arguments made sometimes in overlapping papers, they are consolidated for consideration and determination in this single decision. At the outset the court rejects arguments that the court should refuse to consider any of the relief requested in A’s cross-motion because it was made at a time when a stay of the proceedings was in effect. Regardless of whether the temporary restraining order contained in the August 27, 2007 Order to Show Cause precluded the cross-motion at the time it was originally interposed, that TRO had long expired by the time the cross-motion was actually submitted to the court. In the interim, and certainly by the time of submission, all parties had been given an opportunity to oppose the relief requested in the cross-motion on the merits. Thus the relief requested by A will be considered on the merits.

Published on: October 5, 2013

Court Discusses Jurisdiction Issue in Custody Battle

by Stephen Bilkis

In this motion for leave to reargue respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and for leave to reargue the decision and order of this Court dated August 8, 1977. A New York Family Lawyer said that, respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction in this proceeding brought by petitioner, a resident of Queens County, for upward modification of divorce decree, Kings County, dated January 31, 1974. A Queens Divorce Lawyer said that, respondent argues that since he is a resident of Putnam County, a county which does not adjoin the City of New York, this Court lacks jurisdiction (and by inference that petitioner could proceed only by a petition brought in Putnam County, or by a proceeding under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, U.S.D.L.).

A New York Custody Lawyer said that, in October, 1974, an order was made in the Family Court, Kings County, where petitioner then resided (respondent then resided in New York County), on petitioner’s petition for enforcement of said decree. On March 18, 1977, respondent, then a resident of Putnam County, filed a petition in the Family Court, Queens County (where petitioner then resided and now resides) requesting expanded visitation with the child. A Queens Family Lawyer said that, on March 29, petitioner filed a petition in this Court requesting upward modification of support for the child. Both petitions were returnable in Kings County. When the Court was informed that neither party resided in Kings, the file was transferred to Queens County.

A Westchester County Family Lawyer said that, now respondent argues lack of jurisdiction as to petitioner’s petition, in spite of the fact that he desires a hearing in this County on his petition. In addition to the reasons set forth below it is obvious that to require two hearings, in two counties would create a needless multiplicity of suits.