Articles Posted in Divorce

Published on:

by

 

In a case that is one of first impression, this court is confronted with two novel questions: does the attorney confidential privilege survive the death of the client? And, if indeed the privilege does survive, under what circumstances, if any, may the court pierce through the veil of confidentiality?

The defendant, AV, was indicted on January 15, 2002 by a grand jury of the County of Nassau, New York, for the death of RH. The charges are murder in the second degree as an intentional act under Penal Law § 125.25 (1), and murder in the second degree under circumstances involving a depraved indifference to human life under Penal Law § 125.25 (2). The crime predates the 1995 statutory amendments to the Penal Law, and as such is not a capital offense.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

The Attorney General brings this action under the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (“NPCL”) and Article 8 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law to obtain injunctive relief against respondent Long Island Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (“LISPCC”) and its officers and directors.

The Long Island SPCC was incorporated as a non-profit corporation under NPCL § 1403. SPCCs have an unusual status under the law. Although they are not governmental agencies, they are given some quasi-governmental powers in order to effectuate the corporate purpose of protecting children from abuse or neglect. For example, the Long Island SPCC may initiate and participate in court proceedings involving child abuse or neglect (NPCL § 1403(b)(1), Family Court Act § 1032 and Judiciary Law §§ 478 and 484), take children who are the victims of abuse and neglect into protective custody (Social Services Law § 417, Family Court Act § 1024), be appointed guardian of the person of a minor or receive or retain, at its own expense, abused or neglected children pursuant to court order [NPCL § 1403(b)(3) ]. Also, the officers and agents of the Long Island [163 Misc.2d 656] SPCC are peace officers who may acquire handguns and make arrests, providing they are acting in furtherance of the SPCC’s child protective mandate (Criminal Procedure Law §§ 2.10 [7-A], 2.20 and 140.25). However, the agents of the SPCCs are not permitted to represent themselves as police officers.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

This action to vacate a deed or, in the alternative, impress a constructive trust, was originally commenced by the executor in Supreme Court, Nassau County, and was transferred to this court by order of Hon. Thomas P. Phelan dated October 21, 2005. RM, executor of the estate of MM, now moves for summary judgment. The respondent, CS, has cross-moved for summary judgment for a declaration that the transfer was a valid gift.

MM died on July 12, 2004 leaving a will dated May 29, 1987 which was admitted to probate by decree dated March 14, 2005. Letters testamentary issued to RM, the petitioner herein. In addition to RM and Catherine, MM was survived by three other children, Thomas, James and William.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

The motion of the defendants, RM and KM, by counsel, to dismiss the Summons & Information before the Court is determined as hereinafter provided.

The defendants, RM and KM, are the owners in fee of a residential home located at 88 Liberty Boulevard, within the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, also known on the tax map of the County of Nassau as Section 37, Block 400, Lots 39 and 40. They are charged with failure to provide permits or certificates for a kitchen situated on the second floor of the premises, to wit: No Certificate of Occupancy for the two-family dwelling, violation of Sections 3211 and 3206 of the Village Zoning Code. The area is zoned for one-family dwellings or “R-1 Zone.”

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

In two matrimonial actions, the husband appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered January 31, 1989, in Action No. 1, which directed a joint trial of the actions in Westchester County and granted the wife leave to enter a money judgment in the sum of $21,150, representing arrears in maintenance, and (2) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated February 10, 1989, which, based upon the order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered January 31, 1989, referred Action No. 2 to the Supreme Court, Westchester County.

The wife instituted Action No. 1 in the Supreme Court, Westchester County, in 1986, seeking a judgment declaring null and void a Connecticut divorce judgment obtained by the husband in 1985, and ancillary relief. By order entered May 6, 1986, the Connecticut divorce judgment was held a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. By order dated June 27, 1986, the husband’s counterclaim for divorce in Action No. 1 was dismissed and he was directed to pay the wife permanent maintenance in the amount of $225 per week. It was uncontradicted that the husband unilaterally ceased payment of that maintenance in February 1987.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

This court has before it objections to the decision and order of Hearing Examiner Miklitsch dated April 4, 1994. The petitioner, represented by the County Attorney of Rockland County, objects to the dismissal of her petition brought under Article 3-A of the Domestic Relations Law which sought enforcement of a Kings County Family Court order of support and collection of arrears.

On January 24, 1994 the petitioner, Marsha Dow, filed with this court a petition under Article 3-A of the Domestic Relations Law of the State of New York (Uniform Support of Dependents Law [USDL]. Petitioner was a resident of Queens County, New York. Consequently, the clerk of the Queens County Family Court forwarded the petition, along with a certificate signed by a judge of that county, to the Rockland County Family Court wherein the respondent resides. On March 8, 1994 the matter appeared on the calendar of the hearing examiner of this court. Petitioner was represented by the office of the Rockland County Attorney and the respondent was represented by private counsel. The hearing examiner dismissed the petition on that date and a formal order was signed on April 4, 1994. In said order, the hearing examiner stated as the reason for the dismissal, a New York order is not a foreign order under statute. The petitioner has objected to this determination. Respondent has not interposed a rebuttal.

The issue to be decided is whether a petitioner who is a resident or domiciliary of one county of the State of New York can maintain a proceeding under Article 3-A of the Domestic Relations Law to enforce the terms of a New York State order of child support against a respondent who is a resident or domiciliary of another county of the State of New York.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

This is a hybrid proceeding for relief under the Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”), set forth in Article 6 of the Public Officers Law,§§ 84-90, and for related declaratory and mandamus relief. Petitioner/plaintiff asserts that the respondent/defendant Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD” or “respondent”) has violated FOIL by consistently failing to respond properly to legitimate requests for information and documents.

This case seeks not only a vacatur of denials for certain information, but also a declaration by the Court that NCPD has engaged in a pattern and practice of refusing to obey the law, and a judgment in mandamus directing the NCPD to do what it is bound to do under FOIL. It also seeks a related direction ordering respondent, in effect, to certify to the Court annually that it is in compliance with the statute. Finally, petitioner seeks to recoup its costs, including legal fees, expended in its efforts to obtain the information sought.

Continue reading

by
Posted in: , and
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

 

In this family case, Respondent moves this Court by way of Notice of Motion to with draw his admission with respect to this juvenile delinquency matter; and assuming that that part of the motion is granted, to restore the original petition “as it existed at the time of the admission;” and thereafter to proceed with the fact-finding hear-ing.

The Nassau County District Attorney’s Office originally charged this Respondent in the District Court of Nassau County with the offense of burglary in the first degree in violation of §140.30(2) of the Penal Law, a class B felony. Thereafter, and on May 30, 2006, a Judge of the District Court, with the consent of the District Attorney’s Office, and of the Defendant’s attorney, transferred this matter, for all purposes, to the Family Court.

Continue reading

by
Posted in: , and
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

 

The respondent appears specially, by counsel, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition is fatally defective, in that it is made wholly on information and belief.

The petition charges the respondent with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed certain acts in violation of the Penal Law as well as of a local municipal ordinance. The petitioner alleges that he is a person authorized to institute such a proceeding under article 7 of the Family Court Act by reason of the fact that he is one who suffered injury as a result of the said illegal acts of the respondent.

Continue reading

Published on:

by

 

In this family case, defendant moves this Court for an order, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 170.30(1)(f), dismissing the charge of Assault in the Third Degree on the grounds that there exists a legal impediment to conviction.

That Complainant executed a misdemeanor information on December 8, 1990, alleging that her former husband intentionally caused physical injury to her on December 8, 1990 at 6:10 p.m. in the Village of Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.

Continue reading

Contact Information