Articles Posted in Divorce

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It is well recognized that the time table for Election Law cases is extremely tight. Election proceedings have a preference over civil and criminal matters and thus the rules with regard to service are modified to reflect a method of service reasonably calculated to complete service in a timely fashion, but once ordered by the Court there must be strict compliance. In the instant proceeding, an ex-parte application was made to the Special II Justice for “So Ordered” subpoenas to be served on the witnesses and subscribing witnesses to the Respondent Petition, Volume 1, so that Petitioner could proceed with the case on the return date of the Order to Show Cause. Numerous people appeared pursuant to the subpoenas, however they reported to the courtroom of Justice also on the fourth floor, presumably because he had signed the subpoenas. The undersigned’s name appeared below the index number on the subpoena, however Justice’s part clerk apparently mistook the subpoenas as returnable in that part because another election law case is pending there. A call was made by someone in that part to Johnson’s counsel’s office rather than Petitioner’s and the people were told they were free to leave without ever having been referred to the undersigned’s part for the hearing. Both counsels were present before the undersigned during that morning, as the Order to Show Cause was returnable at 9:30 a.m., in this part.

It is conceded that respondent’s counsel brought those responding to the subpoena into a conference room to speak with them. An intern associated with Petitioner’s counsel was present, though no witness testified that he said or did anything. Respondent’s counsel admittedly unilaterally dismissed the people who answered the subpoena, without leave of the Court or authorization from Petitioner’s counsel.

On the record, respondent’s counsel advised the Court that he spoke to four people with regard to the subpoenas. He indicated that they showed him the subpoenas and he advised them that he “would make a motion to quash if they like and represent them for the purpose of the motion to quash because they were clearly not served properly.” At the time he was unaware of the Court Order setting forth the manner in which the subpoenas were to be served.

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This is an appeal by defendant from: (1) a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered August 15, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of (felony) murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and of grand larceny and assault (both in the second degree), and after a jury recommendation, imposing sentence of life imprisonment on the conviction of murder in the first degree; and (2) from ‘each and every intermediate order’ made in the action.

After the crimes were committed, the defendant fled to California, where he was arrested and searched. Immediately after the arrest, the California police searched and found two revolvers in the automobile which the defendant had rented.

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In this summary license holdover proceeding commenced pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) § 713(7), petitioners seek to recover possession of the premises located at 173 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York (“the Subject Property”). Petitioners contend that the license of respondent to occupy the Subject Property has been revoked.

Most of the dispositive issues were undisputed. Petitioners are the owners of the Subject Property. In or about May or June 2007, Respondent moved into the Subject Property with her paramour petitioner’s son after learning she was pregnant with Nicholas. Mr. Robinson is the biological father of respondent. The parties acknowledged that there are no custody or child support matters pending.

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This is a family case brought about during a school camping, then nine-year old child, sustained personal injuries at the Park while playing tag with some 15 fellow campers. The campers were waiting to be picked up at the conclusion of the camp day and were playing tag, as they often did, in a dedicated playground area which also contained a large outdoor play system or “Jungle Gym” comprised of interconnected and elevated walkways, bridges, ramps and ladders.

A witness testified that the tag games was generally conducted on the Jungle Gym – after the game had been ongoing for some thirty minutes, another camper began to chase after him in order to tag him. In an effort to escape, he ran “really fast” towards the Jungle Gym and then ran to an elevated bridge pathway on the equipment, bordered on both sides by a rail fence. He then climbed onto and/or mounted the top of the fence, which was capped by a horizontal rail, and secured himself by gripping the rail with his hands, allowing his legs to dangle freely below.

The witness allegedly sat on the fence in this fashion, “for like ten minutes” because, as he explained, the camper who was attempting to tag him waited “a really long time” anticipating that he might jump. Although the chasing camper ultimately departed and attempted to tag another person, Frank’s hands eventually got “sweaty” and he lost his grip and fell, causing him to strike the ground several feet below and sustain personal injuries, including two fractured wrists.

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In this proceeding under Family Court Act article 10, the New York City Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the Administration for Children’s Services, seeks leave of the court to allow the respondent’s placement with the Commissioner of Social Services [CSS] to lapse, in light of the respondent’s placement with the New York State Division for Youth [DFY].

This court placed the respondent, now fourteen years old, with CSS on October 22, 1991. The Commissioner of Social Services brought a neglect proceeding against the respondent’s father, after the father left respondent in the care of a girlfriend without making any provision for the child’s care. Respondent’s mother died in 1987. CSS worked with the father for the respondent’s return to his care for four years, during which time the father intermittently was incarcerated. In the summer of 1995, the 13 year old respondent ran away from foster care and took up residence with his father.

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On June 20, 2011, the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) filed a petition against respondent mother alleging that she derivatively severely abused the subject child by committing reckless or intentional acts that evinced a depraved indifference to human life and caused serious physical injury to the subject child’s five-year-old sibling Jamar resulting in his death.

The subject child under the age of eighteen whose parent subjected the child to reckless or intentional acts committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, which resulted in serious physical injury to the child as defined in subdivision ten of section 10.00 of the penal law:

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This private placement adoption action presents a number of intertwined legal issues that highlight the shortcomings of the private placement adoption statutes in New York State. The infant who is the subject of the case has now been in the home of the petitioners since February 21, 1998 without the benefit of a valid adoption consent from the parents or a currently valid pre-adoption certification order. The adoption agency that originally accepted custody of the child is no longer supervising this placement because it was not licensed in the state where the child was born. Additionally, the fees charges by the principals involved may not be entirely allowable under New York State law.

There is little statutory or caselaw guidance available to assist the court in unraveling these dilemmas, and few satisfactory remedies available for the obvious failures of those charged with caring for this child to follow the statutory requirements contained in the Domestic Relations Law. What seems apparent, however, is that along the way many purportedly well-intended people ignored the law, creating a situation that puts this adoption in jeopardy.

After an initial review of the adoption petition and the supplementary documents supplied by petitioner’s counsel with his letter dated August 3, 1999 the court issued a decision identifying legal issues of concern.

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This Article 78 proceeding raises the questions whether (1) the County Commissioner of Social Services has discretion as a matter of policy and without regard to the facts of the particular case to refuse a special grant to an aid to dependent children recipient who claims that she and the children are destitute because cash has been stolen from her and (2) whether the proceeding can be maintained as a class action.

The petition alleges that petitioner is the mother of four children, that she receives public assistance in the category of Aid to Dependent Children, that on July 31, 1971 she received a check issued by the Department of Social Services in the amount of $398.00 which she cashed at the bank where she spent $3.00, putting the remaining $395.00 in an envelope in her pocketbook, that she went to the laundromat and then back to the bank and when she sought to pay for the purchases then made could not find the envelope or the money, that she reported her loss to the Department of Social Services and the police, that she was told by the Department that nothing could be done, that its failure to act on petitioner’s request results from its policy of refusing to give emergency aid or to duplicate stolen checks, that without the issuance of a duplicate grant of $395.00, petitioner and her children face exhaustion of their food supply and eviction from their rented home.

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The respondent appears specially, by counsel, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition is fatally defective, in that it is made wholly on information and belief.

The petition charges the respondent with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed certain acts in violation of the Penal Law as well as of a local municipal ordinance. The petitioner alleges that he is a person authorized to institute such a proceeding under article 7 of the Family Court Act by reason of the fact that he is one who suffered injury as a result of the said illegal acts of the respondent.

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The defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 210.20(1)(e) and (h), to dismiss the fourth count of the captioned indictment. In support, he presses two grounds. First, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over that charge of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. Next, he maintains that trial of this count would constitute double jeopardy in any event.

The court has extensively examined all relevant federal and state constitutional provisions, sections of the Penal Law, Judiciary Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, and case law. Upon that review, it is not convinced that dismissal is warranted on either ground urged by the defense. However, for the reasons set forth below, count four of the indictment is dismissed in the interest of justice. CPL 210.20(1)(i).

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