Articles Posted in Divorce

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In this proceeding was instituted pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR by Mr. and Mrs. Banks, public assistance recipients, compelling Respondents to pay the balance owed by the Banks for the installation of a heating system in their home.

Mrs. Banks is the fee owner of the home where she and her husband live together with their six minor children. In 1965, before the Banks were receiving public assistance, they ordered on time payment the installation of a heating system for the second floor of their home to make that floor habitable for the children of their burgeoning family during the winter. They have been receiving public assistance continuously since 1966.

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Upon the foregoing papers, petitioners individually, as preliminary executor of the estate of the decedent and as the vested beneficial owner of shares of the respondent 4C Foods Corp. held by certain trusts, moves for an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 2221 granting leave to renew respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition that was granted in this court’s order dated December 5, 2012, and upon renewal, denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition; and (2), pursuant to CPLR 3025, granting petitioners leave to file and serve an amended petition.

Petitioners’ motion is denied with respect to petitioners’ claims pursuant to Business Corporation Law §§ 623 and 806. With respect to the proposed causes of action premised on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty, the motion to amend is denied, but with leave to file an amended pleading containing such causes of action upon the following events: (1) the executor of the estate of the decedent, is barred from transferring voting shares individually; (2) these voting shares are purchased by respondent, its directors and or its majority shareholders; and (3) such causes of action are not otherwise rendered moot by any determination made in the Nassau County declaratory judgment action. The motion for leave to file an amended petition is granted with respect to the proposed declaratory judgment claim in which petitioner seeks a declaration that the January 11, 2013 notice addressing the transfer of voting shares formerly controlled is a nullity. The special proceeding is converted to a declaratory judgment action, but any further proceedings in the action are stayed pending the determination of the Nassau County declaratory judgment action.

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This motion arises out of an underlying personal injury action, filed in this Court in June 2009, wherein the plaintiff alleged violations under Labor Law §§240 and 241. Plaintiff fell from a ladder while performing construction work on the improved real property owned by defendants. Plaintiff is alleging that the statutory residential exemption does not apply as the real property is in actuality, the site of plaintiff’s business entity.

On September, 2008, the owner of the property entered into a work agreement which provided that his company was to “repair and painting” the “residence”, and the contract was executed by as owner of the subject premises. Such work included the repair of shingles, siding, and painting the house, including the windows and window trimming. According to the defendants, the premises is and was at the time of the underlying action, a private one-family residence and the home of multi generations of the family. The real property included a main house and a renovated cottage. The work was to be performed on the main house.

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The petitioner/mother, and the respondent/father, were divorced by judgment of divorce, dated February 14, 2000 and entered by the Nassau County Clerk on February 15, 2000. The judgment of divorce granted the parties joint legal custody of their children. Physical custody was awarded to the petitioner, subject to the respondent’s right to visitation as set forth in their separation agreement, dated August 31, 1998, which was incorporated (but did not merge) with the judgment of divorce. The separation agreement provided, among other things, that the father would have mid-week overnight visitation with the children.

On April 17, 2003, the petitioner filed an application with this Court for modification of the visitation provisions of the judgment of divorce. The petition requested that the respondent’s mid-week visitation be eliminated, as it was “not practical” because her new husband, had secured employment in the Albany, New York area. The petition stated that she and her four children (the two Jones children and the two children of her current marriage) would relocate to the Albany area to join her husband on or about June 30, 2003, at the end of the school year.

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A New York Family Lawyer said that, by motion dated January 5, 2009, respondent seeks to dismiss the instant proceeding, alleging that she is not a licensee and therefore cannot be evicted in a summary proceeding. Petitioner opposes the motion and, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b), requests summary judgment and a judgment of possession.

A Nassau Divorce Lawyer said that, according to the affidavits of the parties, respondent, a 42 year-old attorney, is petitioner’s daughter-in-law and was married to petitioner’s son in 2001. Soon thereafter, the couple moved into the subject premises located at 345 Harbor Drive, Oyster Bay, New York. The premises are described as a “beach cottage” located on a parcel of land solely owned by petitioner, whose own residence is on the same parcel of land.

Respondent and her husband resided together at the subject premises with the permission of petitioner until March 2007, when respondent’s husband moved out. Respondent’s husband then filed a divorce proceeding, which is currently pending in Suffolk County Supreme Court. Petitioner has served respondent with a 10-day notice to quit pursuant to RPAPL 713 and commenced the instant summary proceeding to evict the respondent from the subject premises, contending that respondent is a licensee.

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In this probate proceeding objections were filed and a jury demanded by respondents. A motion is now made by them to dismiss the petition before any trial on the merits upon the ground that the decedent was not a (domiciliary) resident of Nassau County at her death on February 14, 1977 as specified in SCPA 206, subd. 1. They request that the proceeding be forwarded to New York County as the “proper county of residence” and also for the convenience of witnesses.

In support of the motion there have been filed affidavits of respondents’ attorney and of respondent, along with copies of affidavits and exhibits which had been previously submitted to this court in connection with an application to revoke letters testamentary which had been issued to the proponent here on the estate of this decedent’s husband, who died on May 26, 1975. In opposition to the motion various other facts are asserted to sustain proponent’s claim that Nassau County was the domiciliary residence of decedent and both attorneys have submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions. The court has examined them and will discuss below the various facts alleged by both sides.

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Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for the cost of tuition for a foster child, pursuant to Education Law section 3202(5)(a) which provides for the distribution of the cost of educating indigent children among the school districts of this state. This child’s mother, was confined to the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility at Bedford Hills, New York when the child was born on June 27, 1965. The mother, immediately prior to her incarceration, resided for several months in 1964 within the Amityville Central School District. She remained in prison until January 5, 1970 and has thereafter not returned to live in Amityville.

The Nassau County Department of Social Services assumed responsibility for the support and maintenance of Cheryl on February 16, 1966, and ever since, has had her in their charge. It appears that the child was placed in foster care in Westbury at the age of eight months and has received her education within the schools of the plaintiff Westbury School District.

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Following an 11-day hearing, Family Court, by order entered September 15, 2005, awarded respondent wife sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor child, D (born in 2000), and established a visitation schedule for petitioner. Family Court did so with great hesitation, noting respondent’s marked weaknesses as a parent, including her insistence that petitioner sexually abused the child—despite the lack of sufficient credible evidence to sustain that allegation—and her noted lack of effort to encourage any sort of a relationship between the child and petitioner.

Shortly thereafter, respondent failed to produce the child for a scheduled visitation with petitioner in Nassau County, prompting Family Court to order the parties to appear on September 28, 2005 to address this issue. At that time, it came to light that respondent recently had informed the child’s school psychologist that petitioner had sexually abused the child; the school psychologist, in turn, filed a report with the Nassau County Department of Social Services. Respondent conceded that she did not advise the school psychologist of the prior proceedings in Family Court or that the allegations of abuse had been thoroughly explored and laid to rest in the course thereof. Family Court then directed that neither party discuss the prior allegations of sexual abuse with anyone without the express permission of the court.

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In 1971, a mildly retarded individual was admitted to the Wassaic Developmental Center, a State institution for the mentally retarded. At the time of her admission, she was 16 years of age, and had a known history of epileptic seizures which rendered her immobile for minutes at a time. Her medication, Dilantin, kept her epileptic condition under control although she did continue to experience some seizures following her admission. In 1974, the child was placed in a family-care home. At the time of the placement, 6the foster mother was informed by social workers that the child was an epileptic, but was never given any records regarding her condition. The foster mother was told that the child was to take her medication three times a day. Between the years 1974 and 1978, the child suffered periodic seizures while under the foster parents’ supervision.

The foster’s residence had been certified by the State as a family-care home following an inspection in or about 1975. A recertification was made in 1977. During the certification inspections, as well as intermittent other inspections, no hazardous conditions were found to exist in the home. The second-floor bathroom, where the underlying incident occurred, was outfitted with a bathtub, commode, sink and closet. The bathtub, which was enclosed by sliding glass doors, was equipped with a showerhead and faucet with one control for the hot and cold water. The door to the bathroom was a solid, standard, wood type with a butterfly lock below the handle on the inside of the bathroom. There was no turning device for the lock on the outside of the door. The foster’s were never directed to remove or change the lock on the bathroom door.

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