Divorce

Published on: August 30, 2014

Petitioner Moves for Discontinuation of Child Support for Eighteen Year Old Child

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said sometime in October of 1968, a separation agreement was entered into by the parties (husband and wife), the terms of which were subsequently incorporated into a divorce decree granted and entered in Mexico. The agreement gave the mother, the respondent, custody of the children of the marriage and ordered the petitioner to provide support for their son, S, in the amount of $30 per week with visitation rights. Thereafter, on petitioner’s motion to compel visitation, the court by order entered 15 February 1977 granted petitioner specific revised rights of visitation with S.

Since the date of entry of the order of 15 February 1977, petitioner alleges that: he has been permitted to visit S only five times and has not been permitted to see him at all for the past five years; on his last attempt to see S, respondent’s husband told him S did not want to see him and ordered him to leave; in 1979, he discovered that S ceased using his surname, he had taken that of his stepfather and he has been known by that name since 1976.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that subsequently, petitioner moves pursuant to § 241 of the Domestic Relations Law for the suspension of the provision in the judgment of divorce for the support of the parties’ eighteen year-old son.

Published on: August 29, 2014

Husband Moves to Terminate Wife’s Visitation Rights

by Stephen Bilkis

A Manhattan Family Lawyer said this is a matrimonial action where plaintiff, the wife, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated 10 November 1982, which granted defendant husband’s motion to modify the visitation provisions of a judgment of divorce to eliminate plaintiff’s visitation with the parties’ son to the extent of reducing her visitation rights and denied plaintiff’s cross motion to vacate the defendant’s motion. The order appealed from allows the plaintiff to visit with her son after submission to the court of proposed visitation dates and only with strict supervision. The appellate court affirms the said order, with costs, and states its reasons as follows:

A Manhattan Family Lawyer said that first, plaintiff should be allowed visitation with the child. The Special Term’s finding that plaintiff’s exercise of her right of visitation with her son is not detrimental to the welfare of the child is actually supported by the record. Thus, it is proper to deny the defendant’s motion insofar as it sought to eliminate all visitation rights.

Second, the Special Term’s finding that plaintiff’s visitation rights must be exercised in New York under supervised conditions since plaintiff had previously fled the jurisdiction with the marital issue and had disregarded prior judicial decrees is also correct. Plaintiff’s past history amply supports the conclusion that plaintiff will likely abscond with the child if permitted unfettered access. Based on the protracted record and extensive litigation here, a further hearing on this issue is unnecessary, as held in the landmark cases of McKinley v. McKinley and Heely v. Heely.

Published on: August 28, 2014

Court Decides if Petitioner and Respondent May be Subject to a Licensee Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in January of 1989, the petitioner purchased a premises known as Pine brook Avenue, New York. A certified copy of the deed to the premises was offered into evidence, although the respondent concedes that her name does not appear on the deed or mortgage. The monthly mortgage payment for the premises at issue is $1,350 per month. In April of 1994, the parties had a child out of wedlock. In December of 1997, the respondent and the parties’ minor child moved into the subject premises with the petitioner. At the time that the respondent moved into the premises in question, there was no written agreement between the parties with regard to the subject premises and the respondent was not married to the petitioner. However, the parties were involved in a relationship, as boyfriend and girlfriend, and had been involved for some time. In July of 1999, the parties’ second child was born out of wedlock. Sometime after the birth of the parties’ second child, in early 2000, the relationship between the parties failed.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, soon thereafter, the respondent brought a Family Court proceeding for child support of the parties’ two minor children. As a result of this proceeding, a Family Court order of support was issued. In May of 2000, the respondent commenced another Family Court proceeding. This proceeding was to obtain a protective order. On December 1, 2000, an order of protection was ordered by the Nassau County Family Court, in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner, upon default of the petitioner. Shortly after the order of protection was issued, the petitioner demanded that the respondent leave the premises.

A Westchester County Family Lawyer said that, in December of 2000, the petitioner served the respondent a 10-day notice to vacate the premises. In January of 2001, the petitioner commenced a holdover proceeding to obtain exclusive possession of the premises in question, on the ground that the respondent is a “licensee” whose license has been terminated by the proper notice and service under RPAPL 713 (7). The respondent waived any defects in the 10-day notice, the petition and any jurisdictional defects. At the commencement of this proceeding there was no child support or custody order in effect. The order of protection, however, was in effect.

Published on: August 27, 2014

Defendant Proposes to Dismiss Case Under DRL 230

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, plaintiff commenced this divorce action via summons with notice. Prior to serving the summons with notice, Plaintiff moves for an Order authorizing an alternative method of service, for custody, child support, maintenance and attorney’s fees. Although Defendant submits no opposition papers to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant affirmatively moves to dismiss the action “pursuant to DRL §230 claiming there is no subject matter jurisdiction in this Court to consider this matter.” Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, plaintiff wife also moves for: (1) An Order granting her primary physical and legal custody of the parties’ two (2) children, directing that so long as the daughter resides with her farther, he shall provide the Plaintiff wife all of the child’s residence information, access to all educational, medical and related personnel and records, and further directing that her daughter travel to and stay at the mother’s residence during all school recesses in excess of three (3) days; (2) An Order directing the Defendant husband to pay child support to the mother in conformance with the Child Support Standards Act, including maintaining any and all health insurance as is currently available through him in his capacity in the United States Navy, and, to bear in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes, any and all unreimbursed and/or uncovered medical and related expenses; (3) An Order direction husband to pay spousal support in an amount sufficient to permit Plaintiff to meet her ongoing needs during the pendency of this action; (4) An Order directing the father to pay attorneys’ fees on behalf of wife so as to permit her to have proper and sufficient representation.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff fails to state a cause of action.

Published on: August 10, 2014

Court Decides if Support Payments Should be Terminated

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in a matrimonial action in which the plaintiff wife had previously been granted a divorce, the defendant husband appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated August 25, 1981, which granted plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of a receiver of all defendant’s property in the State of New York, “particularly all of his right, title and interest in and to the former marital residence”, named plaintiff as the receiver, awarded plaintiff a counsel fee of $750, and denied defendant’s cross motion to, inter alia, suspend prospective payments of alimony and child support, on the ground that plaintiff unreasonably withheld visitation, and (2) from a further order of the same court, dated October 22, 1981, which denied his motion to renew.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said in a stipulation settling their differences, which was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce, the parties agreed, inter alia, that plaintiff would have exclusive possession of the marital residence, owned by them as tenants by the entirety. However, plaintiff was given the right to elect to sell the marital residence. The defendant further agreed to pay plaintiff $50 per week alimony and a total of $100 per week child support. The stipulation also provided: “Each party shall own free of any claim or right of the other all of the items of property, real, personal and mixed, of any kind, nature or description, and wheresoever’s situated, which are now owned by him or her”.

A Bronx Family Lawyer said that, in January, 1981, defendant petitioned the Family Court, Nassau County, for an order suspending his child support obligations on the ground that plaintiff had unreasonably denied him visitation with the children. By order dated January 28, 1981, his application was denied. A Nassau Visitation Lawyer said that, in June, 1981, defendant made a second application in the Family Court, Nassau County, for suspension of alimony and/or maintenance, on the ground, inter alia, that he was unreasonably denied visitation. By order dated July 17, 1981, his application was, again, denied and a judgment for arrears was entered against him.

Published on: August 9, 2014

Petitioner Moves for Suspension of Child Support Payments

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that sometime in October of 1968, a separation agreement was entered into by the parties (husband and wife), the terms of which were subsequently incorporated into a divorce decree granted and entered in Mexico. The agreement gave the mother, the respondent, custody of the children of the marriage and ordered the petitioner to provide support for their son, S, in the amount of $30 per week with visitation rights. Thereafter, on petitioner’s motion to compel visitation, the court by order entered 15 February 1977 granted petitioner specific revised rights of visitation with S.

Since the date of entry of the order of 15 February 1977, petitioner alleges that: he has been permitted to visit S only five times and has not been permitted to see him at all for the past five years; on his last attempt to see S, respondent’s husband told him S did not want to see him and ordered him to leave; in 1979, he discovered that S ceased using his surname, he had taken that of his stepfather and he has been known by that name since 1976.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that subsequently, petitioner moves pursuant to § 241 of the Domestic Relations Law for the suspension of the provision in the judgment of divorce for the support of the parties’ eighteen year-old son.

Published on: August 7, 2014

Court Rules in Paternity Suit

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said this proceeding before the court is a petition by X for an order declaring him to be the father of PJ who was born on 16 July 1999 and for an order setting his child support obligation. A, the child’s mother, opposes the petition. B, married to A at the time of PJ’s conception and birth and continues to be married to her today, also opposes the paternity petition. The Attorney for the Child also opposes the paternity petition.

On 7 January 2004, X filed his petition. At around this time, PJ was four-and-a-half years old. For a variety of reasons not having anything to do with X, the case took an inordinately long time to conclude. A and B together successfully evaded service for more than 19 months. When the Magistrate learned that A was married when PJ was born, she added B as a necessary party, issued a summons for him to appear. The court referred the matter to a judge to address the issues of equitable estoppel and presumption of legitimacy.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said X and his sister, M, testified in favor of X’s petition. A and B testified in opposition to the petition and in support of their affirmative defenses of the presumption of legitimacy and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Having considered the evidence and had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Published on: August 5, 2014

Court Looks at Whether Respondent may be Subject of a Summary Licensee Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in January of 1989, the petitioner purchased a premises known as Pine brook Avenue, New York. A certified copy of the deed to the premises was offered into evidence, although the respondent concedes that her name does not appear on the deed or mortgage. The monthly mortgage payment for the premises at issue is $1,350 per month. In April of 1994, the parties had a child out of wedlock. In December of 1997, the respondent and the parties’ minor child moved into the subject premises with the petitioner. At the time that the respondent moved into the premises in question, there was no written agreement between the parties with regard to the subject premises and the respondent was not married to the petitioner. However, the parties were involved in a relationship, as boyfriend and girlfriend, and had been involved for some time. In July of 1999, the parties’ second child was born out of wedlock. Sometime after the birth of the parties’ second child, in early 2000, the relationship between the parties failed.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, soon thereafter, the respondent brought a Family Court proceeding for child support of the parties’ two minor children. As a result of this proceeding, a Family Court order of support was issued. In May of 2000, the respondent commenced another Family Court proceeding. This proceeding was to obtain a protective order. On December 1, 2000, an order of protection was ordered by the Nassau County Family Court, in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner, upon default of the petitioner. Shortly after the order of protection was issued, the petitioner demanded that the respondent leave the premises.

A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, in December of 2000, the petitioner served the respondent a 10-day notice to vacate the premises. In January of 2001, the petitioner commenced a holdover proceeding to obtain exclusive possession of the premises in question, on the ground that the respondent is a “licensee” whose license has been terminated by the proper notice and service under RPAPL 713 (7). The respondent waived any defects in the 10-day notice, the petition and any jurisdictional defects. At the commencement of this proceeding there was no child support or custody order in effect. The order of protection, however, was in effect.

Published on: August 4, 2014

Defendant Claims Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, this is a proceeding under Section 890, subdivision 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a father who is alleged to have neglected to provide for his wife and child according to his means. The proceeding came on for trial and the Court ordered a payment of $20 weekly. A bond was required and the matter adjourned to give defendant an opportunity to furnish the bond.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, the defendant has raised a question of jurisdiction. However, the Court entertained serious doubt as to its jurisdiction, and on its own motion, took the question under consideration.

Nassau County Family Lawyer said the issue in this case is whether the Children’s Court of Nassau County have exclusive jurisdiction of child support proceedings completely pre-empting the District Court of Nassau County in the cases enumerated in Section 30 of the Children’s Court Act.

Published on: August 3, 2014

Wife Seeks Annullment of Marriage

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that on September 16, 2000, Mother and Father, who are New York residents, were married in a civil ceremony while in Las Vegas, Nevada. At the time of said marriage, the Mother believed that she had been divorced from her prior husband, with whom she has a nine-year old child, as they had executed a Stipulation Agreement settling their New York divorce action on January 19, 2000. However, the prior marriage was in reality not dissolved until the issuance of a Judgment of Divorce dated December 21, 2000, which incorporated but did not merge with the Agreement. This notwithstanding, the Mother and Father lived as husband and wife with the son of the prior marriage, and on May 15, 2001, they had the child subject to this proceeding.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, difficulties apparently ensued between the couple in 2004, prompting the Mother a practicing attorney to commence custody, family offense and child support proceedings against the Father in Nassau County Family Court on January 25, 2005. A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, a Temporary Order of Protection was issued in the Mother’s favor. There was Child Protective Services involvement with the family. On August 26, 2005, the Family Court entered a Temporary Order of Support ordering the Father to pay temporary support and child care expenses in the sum of $486 biweekly to the Mother. The Father was apparently current in his child support payments. Those proceedings were, however, eventually either withdrawn or dismissed by the Family Court.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, shortly thereafter, on or about September 14, 2005, the Father commenced an Action for Annulment against the Mother in the District Court of Clark County in the State of Nevada, on the grounds that the Mother was married to someone other than him at the time of their marriage, and had not cohabited with her since learning the truth. Despite service upon her as found by the District Court in Nevada, the Mother failed to answer or appear on that action and a default was declared against her on October 10, 2005. The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, State of Nevada then issued a Decree of Annulment on November 15, 2005, declaring the prior marriage to be “null and void and of no effect,” and restoring each of the parties to the status of a “single unmarried person.” Relevantly, the Nevada Decree also adjudged and decreed that “each party be awarded his or her property as determined in accordance with Nevada law and that each party be held responsible for any liabilities, debts or obligations incurred in their own name of associated with property awarded to him or her.”