Articles Posted in Divorce

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This family case arises out of the death of a decedent on August 25, 2003. Plaintiff, Administrator, husband of the decedent, brings this action for medical and psychiatric malpractice against a hospital and 3 doctors.

The medical and psychiatric history of the decedent, a 51 year old married woman at the time of her death, is as follows. Decedent gave birth to triplet daughters in 1982. After the birth of her daughters, she experienced postpartum depression and was, for a brief period of time, hospitalized in the psychiatric ward of the hospital where she gave.

On or about August 12, 2003, her daughter attempted suicide by taking “pills” after her friends’ drowning deaths. The husband testified at his deposition that Decedent also was depressed as a result of the children’s death and their daughter’s suicide attempt. On August 15, 2003, the child sought psychological care. She was accompanied by her parents to the appointment.

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This is a contested matrimonial action before the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

On 6 January 2010, the plaintiff, the husband moved by order to show cause and prayed for an order directing the return of their two children, A, age 7, and M, age 4, to New York State, for an order awarding the him temporary custody of their children, and for an order awarding the defendant, the wife, reasonable visitation with the minor children within the State of New York.

On 9 April 2010, the wife opposed the husband’s application and cross moved by order to show cause and prayed for an order dismissing the husband’s application on the basis that New York is not the home state pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and for permission for her to commence a custody proceeding in California, and for an order directing her husband to pay all costs associated with Court appearances, including but not limited to, transportation costs including airfare, car rentals, hotel costs, and daycare.

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This was a case before the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Kings County.

It involved a Notice of Motion, Order to Show Cause, Petition and Cross Motion where the court was called upon to determine (1) whether the attorney for the defendant’s application to be relieved as attorney of record should be granted; (2) if the defendant’s applications brought pro se while still represented by counsel were properly before the court; (3) whether or not the defendant was entitled to a 30 day stay of all proceedings in the event counsel was relieved pursuant to CPLR 321(c); (4) whether or not the defendant was entitled to a second court appointed counsel pursuant to Judiciary Law section 35(8)(b) on the issues of custody, visitation and an order of protection; (5) whether or not the defendant should have had the benefit of a court assigned interpreter; (6) the sua sponte sealing of photographs of the child’s genitalia and buttocks which were annexed exhibits to defendant’s order to show cause.

The counsels of defendant’s application to be relieved:

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This is an appeal brought before the Supreme Court on the issue of whether Domestic Relations Law § 72, New York’s grandparental visitation statute, is unconstitutional on its face in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel v Granville (530 US 57). The court granted the motion and “deemed” the statute to be unconstitutional. The court ruled that the statute is not facially invalid.

The petitioner, a grandparent, commenced this proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 to obtain visitation with his 15 minor grandchildren.

The respondents are the grandchildren’s parents (the parents).

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This is a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights of the natural father. The petitioner, Little Flower Children’s Services, appealed from an order of the Family Court, Kings County dated 22 September 1993, which dismissed the petition. The court affirmed the order, without costs or disbursements.

On 4 December 1985, SG, the subject child in this termination of parental rights proceeding was born.

Sometime in November 1987, when SG was less than two years old, the Commissioner of Social Services removed SG from her mother’s care because of her mother’s drug use, and placed the child with her maternal aunt. SG has remained in her maternal aunt’s home since her initial placement over six years ago, and SG’s mother has voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the child.

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A couple was married on August 21, 1975. They had two children from that marriage. K born July 16, 1976 (13) and A born June 25, 1978 (11). Mr. H and Mrs. C were divorced on April 3, 1985 and both children presently reside with their natural mother, respondent, Mrs. C. H then married petitioner M on June 8, 1986. They also have two children: AY born April 8, 1987 (2) and IY born September 29, 1988 (1). Petitioner, M also has a child from a prior marriage, N born December 18, 1980 (9), who resides with her, Mr. H, AY and IY.

According to the terms of the April 3, 1985 judgment of divorce which incorporated a separate agreement entered into by C and H, C, was granted custody of the two children, K and A, while H was granted visitation rights. On more than one occasion, H violently assaulted Mrs. C resulting in numerous Orders of Protection from the Kings County Family Court. C thereafter brought an Order to Show Cause in October 1988, inter alia to suspend visitation by H. In this Order to Show Cause, the request was made for a temporary restraining order restraining H from undertaking visitation. This T.R.O. was stricken by Justice MS when the Order to Show Cause was signed. However, the Appellate Division reinstated this T.R.O.

The motion came to be heard before Judicial Hearing Officer DC. After a hearing J.H.O. DC rendered a decision on June 30, 1989, stating that there is no question that defendant, [Mr. H] did violently and viciously attack and severely bruise and injure the plaintiff Mrs. C in the presence of his children who were struck several times.

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In an action for divorce, defendant husband appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, dated December 23, 1981, as (1) granted custody of the parties’ child to plaintiff wife; (2) directed defendant to provide for plaintiff’s psychotherapeutic assistance in the event that plaintiff cannot provide for it herself; (3) directed defendant to pay plaintiff’s legal fees in the sum of $2,750; and (4) set forth a schedule of visitation. Plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as (1) ordered that if she interferes with defendant’s visitation without proper cause, the issue of custody will be reviewed; (2) provided for defendant’s visitation rights including overnight visitation; (3) provided that defendant’s obligation to pay alimony and child support was dependent upon defendant being permitted visitation; and (4) granted only $2,750 in legal fees.

Council said that, judgment modified, on the law, by deleting the provision which directed defendant to provide for plaintiff’s psychotherapeutic assistance in the event that plaintiff cannot provide for it herself. As so modified, judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In determining a question of child custody, a court must weigh various factors and policies in order to ascertain what is in the child’s best interests. On appellate review, the finding of the nisi prius court must be accorded the greatest respect and should not be set aside absent sufficient articulable reasons. Based upon our review of the record before us, we find no basis for setting aside the determination here.

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In an action by an infant wife for separation on the grounds of cruelty and nonsupport, in which the defendant husband asserted a counterclaim for separation on the ground of abandonment, a judgment was entered in the Supreme Court, on May 18, 1959, after trial, in favor of the defendant, dismissing the complaint, granting him a separation on his counterclaim, awarding custody of their child to plaintiff, with visitation rights to the defendant, and directing the defendant to pay plaintiff $35 per week for the child’s support.

By order dated June 24, 1959 such judgment was resettled so as to define specifically defendant’s visitation rights. By order dated July 10, 1959 such judgment was amended by adding three provisions: (1) enjoining plaintiff from taking the child out of the City of New York; (2) directing plaintiff to make the child available to the defendant during the periods prescribed for his visitation; and (3) suspending defendant’s obligation to make payments for the support of the child in the event that, and as long as, plaintiff should frustrate defendant’s visitation rights by keeping the child out of said City.

The plaintiff by her guardian ad litem now appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, which, inter alia: (1) denied her motion for a counsel fee and expenses to prosecute her appeal from said resettled amended judgment and for an award of $35 a week for the child’s support during the pendency of such appeal; (2) granted defendant’s motion to award custody of the child to him, to hold plaintiff in contempt for violating the judgment with respect to defendant’s visitation rights, and to stay plaintiff from all proceedings (excepting appeals) as long as she continues to violate said judgment and the order appealed from; and (3) further modified the resettled amended judgment by awarding custody of the child to defendant, by prescribing plaintiff’s visitation rights and by enjoining plaintiff from taking the child out of said City.

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The appellant (hereinafter the mother), is the mother of the three children who are the subjects of these neglect proceedings. In the early morning hours of February 4, 2009, the children, then aged six years, four years, and nine months, respectively, were found by a police officer wandering the streets alone. The next day, February 5th, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter ACS) filed petitions in the Family Court, alleging that the mother neglected her children as a result of this incident. The Family Court issued an order of protection prohibiting all contact between the mother and her children, with the exception of ACS-supervised visitation. The children were then paroled to the care of their non-respondent father and his mother (the children’s paternal grandmother), with whom the father lived.

On June 2, 2009, the mother orally requested a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028 for the return of her children. Ultimately, the Family Court denied the mother’s request for a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing on the ground that a hearing was not required because the children were paroled to the father’s care. Instead, the Family Court granted an application of the attorney for the children for a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify the order of protection. While a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing must be held within three court days after the application, there is no requirement that a Family Court Act § 1061 hearing be held within any period of time. The Family Court Act § 1061 hearing was not held for nearly 1½ years, during which time the children remained in their father’s care. The Family Court Act § 1061 hearing was eventually scheduled for the same day that oral argument on the instant appeal was scheduled before this Court. Several months later, while the determination of this appeal was pending, by order dated October 20, 2010, the Family Court returned the children to the mother.

The question presented on this appeal is whether a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing is triggered by the removal of a child from the home of one parent and temporary placement into the custody of another parent or relative, or whether such hearing is triggered only where a child is placed into government-administered foster care. Although the Family Court returned the children to the mother while the determination of this appeal was pending, we find that this case nevertheless presents a justiciable controversy, and we reverse the order denying the mother’s application for a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing.

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A New York Family Lawyer said the question presented by the instant case is whether the evidence adduced on NYCCS’s direct case at the combined Family Court Act § 1027 hearing, for the child DD, and Family Court Act § 1028 hearing, for the children JJ and BB, establishes imminent risk sufficient to warrant the children remaining in non-kinship foster care during the pendency of these proceedings. In the Court’s view, that question must be answered in the negative since any possible risk to the children from the father can be mitigated by the issuance of a temporary order of protection and an order that the mother re-enter a domestic violence shelter and resume domestic violence counseling, as well as her participation in other recommended services.

This proceeding was initially commenced on June 3, 2010, when NYCCS filed petitions against respondent mother and respondent father pursuant to Article 10 of the Family Court Act. The petitions alleged that the mother and father failed to provide a minimum degree of care to their three children since the father committed acts of domestic violence against the mother in the presence of the children and both parents failed to ensure that the school-aged children attended school regularly.

Upon the filing of the petition, the court granted NYCCS’s request for a removal of the children and directed that they be restrictively placed with the maternal grandmother. In addition, the court entered a temporary order of protection against the father. That order directed the father to refrain from committing any family offenses against the children or the maternal grandmother and stay away from them except for visitation supervised by the grandmother or the agency.

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