Divorce

Published on: April 20, 2016

Husband and Wife Embroiled in a Custody Battle

by Stephen Bilkis

In an action for divorce, defendant husband appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, dated December 23, 1981, as (1) granted custody of the parties’ child to plaintiff wife; (2) directed defendant to provide for plaintiff’s psychotherapeutic assistance in the event that plaintiff cannot provide for it herself; (3) directed defendant to pay plaintiff’s legal fees in the sum of $2,750; and (4) set forth a schedule of visitation. Plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as (1) ordered that if she interferes with defendant’s visitation without proper cause, the issue of custody will be reviewed; (2) provided for defendant’s visitation rights including overnight visitation; (3) provided that defendant’s obligation to pay alimony and child support was dependent upon defendant being permitted visitation; and (4) granted only $2,750 in legal fees.

Judgment modified, on the law, by deleting the provision which directed defendant to provide for plaintiff’s psychotherapeutic assistance in the event that plaintiff cannot provide for it herself. As so modified, judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In determining a question of child custody, a court must weigh various factors and policies in order to ascertain what is in the child’s best interests. On appellate review, the finding of the nisi prius court must be accorded the greatest respect and should not be set aside absent sufficient articulable reasons. Based upon our review of the record before us, we find no basis for setting aside the determination here.

Published on: April 19, 2016

Plaintiff Files Action for Nonsupport and Cruelty

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an action by an infant wife for separation on the grounds of cruelty and nonsupport, in which the defendant husband asserted a counterclaim for separation on the ground of abandonment, a judgment was entered in the Supreme Court, on May 18, 1959, after trial, in favor of the defendant, dismissing the complaint, granting him a separation on his counterclaim, awarding custody of their child to plaintiff, with visitation rights to the defendant, and directing the defendant to pay plaintiff $35 per week for the child’s support.

By order dated June 24, 1959 such judgment was resettled so as to define specifically defendant’s visitation rights. By order dated July 10, 1959 such judgment was amended by adding three provisions: (1) enjoining plaintiff from taking the child out of the City of New York; (2) directing plaintiff to make the child available to the defendant during the periods prescribed for his visitation; and (3) suspending defendant’s obligation to make payments for the support of the child in the event that, and as long as, plaintiff should frustrate defendant’s visitation rights by keeping the child out of New York City.

Plaintiff by her guardian ad litem now appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, which, inter alia: (1) denied her motion for a counsel fee and expenses to prosecute her appeal from said resettled amended judgment and for an award of $35 a week for the child’s support during the pendency of such appeal; (2) granted defendant’s motion to award custody of the child to him, to hold plaintiff in contempt for violating the judgment with respect to defendant’s visitation rights, and to stay plaintiff from all proceedings (excepting appeals) as long as she continues to violate said judgment and the order appealed from; and (3) further modified the resettled amended judgment by awarding custody of the child to defendant, by prescribing plaintiff’s visitation rights and by enjoining plaintiff from taking the child out of said City.

Published on: April 16, 2016

Father Files for Modification of Custody Order

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner and respondent are the parents of a nine (9) year old child. The parties obtained a judgment of divorce in New Jersey on June 13, 2003 and, on consent, were awarded an order of joint legal custody for the child.

A Kings County Family Lawyer said that the father filed a violation petition and a petition for modification of the custody order on April 25, 2007. The father was seeking a specific and expanded visitation schedule. By stipulation the parties resolved the visitation issues between them prior to trial.

The mother had filed a petition to modify the custody order to provide for sole legal custody of the child on May 6, 2008. A trial was conducted in Kings County Family Court for the sole purpose of determining whether the existing order of joint legal custody should be modified to award sole legal custody to the mother.

Published on: February 18, 2016

Court Grants Father’s Petition to Modify an Order for Visitation

by Stephen Bilkis

In a related visitation proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated November 30, 2012, as, after a hearing, in effect, granted his petition to modify an order of visitation dated January 14, 2010, only to the extent of awarding him supervised daytime visitation.

An order dated January 14, 2010, the Family Court awarded the father, who lives in Texas, unsupervised visitation with the subject child in New York, including overnight visitation during various school holidays. The only restrictions upon the father’s visitation were that a social worker would monitor exchanges of the subject child and would have to pre-approve any accommodations chosen by the father for overnight visitation. At one point, the Family Court modified the visitation order by suspending overnight visitation. However, on a prior appeal, this Court reversed that order of the Family Court, thereby effectively reinstating overnight visitation.

In October 2010, the father filed a petition to modify the order of visitation dated January 14, 2010 (hereinafter the January 2010 visitation order), so as to eliminate the involvement of a social worker in monitoring exchanges of the subject child and approving accommodations for overnight visitation. In opposing the father’s petition, the attorney for the child requested that any parenting time should be of short duration and at specific locations. The attorney for the child did not request supervised visitation. In an order dated December 7, 2010, the Family Court, in effect, denied the father’s petition to modify and granted the application of the attorney for the child to modify the January 2010 visitation order so as to limit the father’s parenting time to brief unsupervised visits at specific, public places.

Published on: February 17, 2016

Court Rules on Supplemental Needs Trust for Petitioners Son

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an APPEAL by nonparty Commissioner, New York State Department of Health, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Health dated June 7, 2006, made after an administrative fair hearing, that so much of the income of the petitioner’s decedent as was deposited into a supplemental needs trust for the benefit of the decedent’s adult disabled son was required to be included in the calculation of the decedent’s eligibility and entitlement to Medicaid benefits during her lifetime and in the calculation of the obligation of the decedent’s estate for the reimbursement of a certain portion of those benefits, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in Nassau County on January 12, 2007, which granted the petition and annulled the determination.

In New York, the concept of a supplemental needs trust originated in 1978, establishing a vehicle for parents and guardians of adult children with severe and chronic disabilities to provide for their children’s future by transferring their funds to a trust, created to pay for items that will enhance their children’s quality of life without jeopardizing their children’s eligibility for government benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income, pursuant to 42 USC § 1382 et seq. and Medicaid, pursuant to 42 USC § 1396 et seq. and Social Services Law § 363 et seq.

The issues of first impression at the appellate level are whether the transfer of a settlor/parent’s recurring income into a supplemental needs trust created for his or her disabled child must be counted toward (a) the settlor/parent’s net available monthly income for calculation of the amount of the Medicaid benefits to which the settlor/parent is entitled after he or she is determined to be eligible for Medicaid (hereinafter post-eligibility benefits) and (b) the obligation of the estate of a deceased settlor/parent for the reimbursement of a certain portion of those benefits.

Published on: February 15, 2016

Court Rules on Family Court Act 304 Regarding Detaining Juveniles

by Stephen Bilkis

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Director of Employee Relations of the Office of Court Administration, dated July 16, 1984, which denied the petitioners’ out-of-title work grievance, and in which the petitioners also sought declaratory relief, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, which dismissed the petition on the merits, and dismissed the application for a declaratory judgment.

The Special Term correctly concluded that the determination of the Director of Employee Relations of the Office of Court Administration was not arbitrary or capricious. Based on the record before us, we have also determined that Special Term did not err when it found that the petitioners’ request for declaratory relief with respect to the possible future use of Court Officers and Senior Court Officers to guard prisoners in detention cells in courts other than the Family Court was. However, since court officers currently guard juveniles in detention cells at the Family Court, the legality of their use for this purpose is ripe for judicial resolution.

The petitioners’ basic argument is that the detention cells in the various courts are merely an extension of the county jail and that the Sheriff of Nassau County therefore exercises exclusive jurisdiction over them. With respect to the Family Court, this argument clearly lacks merit. Family Court Act § 304.1 precludes the use of a county jail or other facility used to detain adults to house juveniles. No statute gives the County Sheriff custody over juveniles at any time. Therefore, the detention cells at the Family Court are clearly not an extension of the county jail or otherwise under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sheriff.

Published on: February 12, 2016

Mother Charged with Truancy for Her Child

by Stephen Bilkis

On October 2, 2007, New York City Children’s Services (hereinafter NYCCS) filed a petition against respondent mother alleging that her son’s physical, mental or emotional condition had been impaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired, as a result of her failure to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying him with an adequate education in accordance with the provisions of part I of article 65 of the Education Law. Specifically, the petition alleges that the son missed 44 days of school during the 2006-2007 school year and 18 days during the 2007-2008 school year.

On the day the petition was filed, the son was paroled to respondent under NYCCS supervision on the condition that she ensure that he attend school daily absent a medical excuse. Issue was joined on October 19, 2007.

Published on: February 10, 2016

Petitioner Claims State Action Unlawful Regarding Public Assistance Benefits

by Stephen Bilkis

On early December 1971, JR was the grantee of public assistance for the benefit of her four children in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) category. All five lived in a home in Levittown, New York, which was then owned by Mrs. JR and her former husband as tenants in common.

On December 21, 1971, Mr. JR sold his interest in the home to Mrs. JR’s parents for $9,700. Representatives of the Nassau County Department of Social Services, present at the sale, took $2,600 of the proceeds to satisfy a debt for prior public assistance issued to the family. Mrs. JR then, as part of the whole transaction, conveyed her own one-half interest in the home to her parents for no proven consideration, and she continued to live in the home with the children.

Published on: February 9, 2016

Petitioner Was Grantee of Public Assistance for Four Childen

by Stephen Bilkis

In early December 1971, JR was the grantee of public assistance for the benefit of her four children in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) category. All five lived in a home in Levittown, New York, which was then owned by Mrs. JR and her former husband as tenants in common.

On December 21, 1971, Mr. JR sold his interest in the home to Mrs. JR’s parents for $9,700. Representatives of the Nassau County Department of Social Services, present at the sale, took $2,600 of the proceeds to satisfy a debt for prior public assistance issued to the family. Mrs. JR then, as part of the whole transaction, conveyed her own one-half interest in the home to her parents for no proven consideration, and she continued to live in the home with the children.

Published on: February 7, 2016

Stepdaughter Files Claim for Aggravated Harrassment

by Stephen Bilkis

The information dated March 28, 1968, charges the crime of Aggravated Harassment in violation of section 240.30, subdivision 2 of the Penal Law. The complaint is made and sworn to by ERG, who is defendant’s step-daughter.

Pursuant to the information, a summons for purposes of investigation was issued and served by mail. Defendant has appeared specially by her attorney and makes the within motion to vacate the summons upon the grounds that any controversy between the complainant and her father’s wife is exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Family Court and the District Court is without any jurisdiction in this matter.