Divorce

Published on: January 15, 2016

Court Decides Whether an Assault Charge is Considered a Family Offense

by Stephen Bilkis

This misdemeanor information alleging the perpetration of an assault third by one Susan O’Toole and another upon the person of one Cathy O’Toole was transferred to the Family Court by the District Court, the County of Suffolk: First District.

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: Cathy O’Toole went to a bar with her parents and brother where she saw respondent, Susan O’Toole, her brother’s wife. Susan and Cathy’s brother had been separated for some time. It is alleged by Cathy that she was assaulted by Susan and another in a parking lot outside the bar. Susan and Cathy do not reside in the same house.

Published on: January 14, 2016

Plaintiff Brings Motion for Summary Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

The motion (seq. No. 1) by the attorney for the Third-Party Defendant County of Nassau (the County) for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting Summary Judgment dismissing the Third-Party complaint and all cross-claims against the County of Nassau is granted. Cross-motion (seq. No. 2) by the attorneys for JEF for an order pursuant to CPLR §3212 granting Summary Judgment to the Defendant JEF and severing and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims and counterclaims against said Defendant, on the ground that JEF is not individually liable for the torts or breach of contract, if any, of his co-Defendant F & F, P.C., of which Defendant JEF was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder is granted.

NS was born at Nassau County Medical Center on December 25, 1983. A medical malpractice action was commenced on her behalf against the County in 1984. JS, the mother of the Plaintiff who retained F & F, P.C. (F&F) to represent her daughter in the medical malpractice action died on April 1, 1992 during the pendency of the lawsuit. Letters of Administration were issued to JS’s daughter, MS, who was substituted as Plaintiff in the malpractice suit on behalf of the Estate of JS. The malpractice action was settled for $450,000 in 1993. Pursuant to the terms of the infant’s compromise orders (ICO) dated June 2, 1994 and modified January 31, 1995 the County was to issue a check payable to an officer of Defendant ML for the benefit of NS in the amount of $299,500.00 ($450,000.00 less attorney’s fees) and other disbursements. The funds ($299,500.00) were to be deposited by ML in investment accounts for the benefit of NS. Although the County timely issued the check in July 1994, sent it to F&F, who forwarded it to ML, the instrument was never cashed, and no account ever established. The original check was never negotiated or presented for payment. ML returned the original check to F&F with a request that an amended or modified ICO be obtained, to specify that the infant NS’s grandmother EMD (with whom the infant was living in Alabama) be identified as custodian of the infant’s account, and authorize ML to pay income taxes on behalf of the infant on the interest earned. F&F obtained a modified ICO in the malpractice action on January 31, 1995. An attorney working on an “of counsel” capacity for F&F on the malpractice action, forwarded a copy of the modified ICO to EMD, on February 5, 1999 and wrote to ML on February 6, 1999, enclosing the original and modified ICO’s and the check dated July 21, 1994 in the sum of $299,500. ML received the July 21, 1994 check in the sum of $299,500, but failed to open the infant account pursuant to the modified ICO or notify any of the parties that the check was missing.

Published on: January 13, 2016

Plaintiff Files Motion to Dismiss

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner/landlord, commenced this holdover proceeding to recover possession of the Section 8 leasehold premises from respondent/tenant, seeking to terminate the month-to-month tenancy. Tenant moves to dismiss the petition in lieu of answering upon grounds that the notice to terminate and petition are legally insufficient and that petitioner’s acceptance of rent after the notice to terminate was sent nullified the effect of the notice. Landlord opposes the motion to dismiss and maintains that it is untimely pursuant to Justice Court Act §1002.

The parties entered into a lease under the Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program, which was executed in October of 2003. Under paragraph 6 of Part A of the lease, the initial term ended on October 31, 2004, at which time the lease automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis. The lease provides that all notices made by owner or tenant must be in writing and makes no reference to landlord’s attorney or agent.

Published on: January 12, 2016

Court Discusses Problems With Trust Language

by Stephen Bilkis

After providing for a number of bequests, legacies and trusts in various articles of her last will and testament, Maude S. W. McKay, the decedent, disposed of the residue of her estate in the following language

‘TENTH:–All the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, both real and personal, and wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath unto The Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board of the Northern Baptist Convention, a corporation of the State of New York, to be invested and reinvested and the income applied to the objects of said organization.

Published on: January 11, 2016

Plaintiff Brings Case for Interpretation of Real Property Law 451

by Stephen Bilkis

The following statements of fact were found by the trial court: The defendant United States Cremation Company, Limited, is a domestic stock corporation organized in 1884 under the General Business Law (Consol. Laws, c. 20). Among the powers granted by its certificate of incorporation is the right to cremate dead human bodies and to conduct a crematory and columbarium. The defendant has operated a crematory at Fresh Pond in Queens County since 1884. It now is in the process of establishing and erecting a crematory in Nassau County. It is the owner of approximately 27 acres of land located in Central Park (now called Bethpage), town of Oyster Bay, Nassau county. Edwin C. Moore is the owner of approximately 45 acres of land which adjoins that of the defendant on the west. The land of both parties fronts on the south side of the Hempstead-Farmingdale turnpike, which leads to Pinelawn Cemetery, about three miles east. This land of the defendant is located in the district defined by the zoning ordinance of the town of Oyster Bay as a Business H District, and was so placed in a resolution of the town board of the town of Oyster Bay on May 28, 1934, after due notice and hearing. Among the uses permitted in Business H District is that of a crematory and mortuary. On June 6, 1934, a permit was issued by the duly authorized official of the town of Oyster Bay, to wit, the building inspector, to erect and operate a crematory; and immediately thereafter the defendant entered into a contract for the erection and completion of its crematory except for the retorts. Work was commenced the same day the permit was issued.

On the 17th day of August, 1934, a resident taxpayer of the town of Oyster Bay, instituted a mandamus suit in the Supreme Court to compel the town board to revoke the building permit and to compel the said town board to set aside the resolution which placed the land in a Business H District. The application for the mandamus was denied all the way through to the Court of Appeals. This suit related solely to the zoning resolution, no point being raised as to the state statute prohibiting the erection of crematories.

Published on: January 11, 2016

Wife Brings De Novo Hearing Regarding Support

by Stephen Bilkis

The family case at bar involves a petition for support filed pursuant to the Florida Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law. The petitioner-wife seeks a de novo hearing relative to support for the two children of the parties’ marriage as well as support for herself. Respondent-husband, a Suffolk County resident, opposes the petition on the basis that there is presently an existing support order emanating from the Nassau County Family Court and, therefore, the petitioner’s application should be treated as one seeking an upward modification of an order of another court. Respondent contends that the Family Court may transfer the within matter pursuant to Family Court Act Sections 171 and 174 and, therefore, justify this court’s denial of a de novo hearing.

Section 41(1) of the Domestic Relations Law provides that the Uniform Support of Dependents Law ‘. . . shall be construed to furnish an additional or alternative civil remedy and shall in no way affect or impair any other remedy, civil or criminal, provided in any other statute and available to the petitioner in relation to the same subject matter.’ Section 411 of the Family Court Act provides the Family Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over support proceedings initiated under both Article 4 of the Family Court Act and in proceedings under Article 3-A of the Domestic Relations Law, known as the Uniform Support of Dependents Law. In light of this original jurisdiction and the above mentioned Section 41(1) of the Domestic Relations Law, petitioner had a choice to proceed under either the Uniform Support of Dependents Law or seek a transfer of the pending case from Nassau County and then an upward modification and enforcement of that Family Court order pursuant to the Family Court Act.

Published on: January 10, 2016

Father Accused of Sexual Abuse of Four Children

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, respondent mother is the mother of the four subject children. The father is the father of these children and a person legally responsible for them, resides in Grenada where the children resided with a maternal aunt and visited with their father until the summer of 2005. During the years that the twins resided in Grenada, they had telephone contact with respondent mother, however, they rarely saw her.

On January 4, 2007, New York City Children’s Services (hereinafter, “NYCCS”) filed abuse and neglect petitions against respondent mother and respondent father in Kings County Family Court. The petitions alleged that respondent father committed a sex offense against the child. The above incidents were alleged to be in violation of article 130 of Penal Law, including but not limited to §§ 130.20 (sexual misconduct),1 130.65 (sexual abuse in the second degree),2 and 260.10 (endangering the welfare of a minor).

Published on: January 9, 2016

Grandfather Seeks Guardianship of Children

by Stephen Bilkis

In July, 1977, defendant Department of Social Services of the County of Nassau (hereinafter DSS) placed a four-year-old child and his sister in the foster home of defendant Margaret Toomer after the infant’s natural mother was sentenced to prison. Subsequent to placement, the DSS received several reports that the infant was being “beaten” and otherwise “abused” by the foster mother. DSS employees allegedly investigated the complaints and determined that the child should remain in guardian’s care pending completion of their investigation.

On or about November 17, 1978, the decedent’s grandfather and administrator of his estate, commenced the present action against the County of Nassau, the DSS and the guardian. The cause of action against the county defendants asserted, in effect, that they were negligent in placing the infant in guardian’s care, investigating the complaints of abuse against her, and failing to remove the infant from her care. Initially, the county defendants denied these allegations, and then, on April 30, 1984, some five years after the service of the answer, moved for leave to amend their answer to interpose the affirmative defense of immunity and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it was asserted against them.

Published on: January 7, 2016

Plaintiff Moves for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File Timely Complaint

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant moves by order to show cause for the following relief: for an order pursuant to CPLR §§ 327 and 3012(b) as follows: a) granting defendant dismissal of this action by virtue of the plaintiff’s failure to timely serve a complaint; b) granting defendant a dismissal of this action on the ground that this court does not have jurisdiction over his person which has not resided in New York since 1999; c) granting defendant a dismissal of this action on the ground of forum non conveniens in light of the Brazilian action pending since 2002; d) in the alternative, granting defendant a stay of these proceedings pending completion of the 2002 Brazilian action.

In this matrimonial action, the defendant is a Brazilian citizen while plaintiff enjoys dual citizenship with the United States and Brazil. The parties met in 1988 when plaintiff was visiting a friend in Brazil. Thereafter, defendant decided to move to New York to be with plaintiff and the parties were married in a civil ceremony in the state of New York on February 27, 1989.

Published on: January 6, 2016

Court Decides How Certain Taxes Should Be Paid

by Stephen Bilkis

On December 28, 1992, executed a will that made specific bequests to his wife, son and other family members. The will also left $16,500 to three charities and created a trust for the benefit of his wife and son. On December 17, 1997, the testator executed a trust that, at the time of his death, made pre-residuary distributions to family members and left $16,500 to the same three charities. The residuary went into a marital trust for Ruth. It is claimed that at this time the testator had assets of approximately $10,000,000.

On April 6, 2001, the testator created a second trust that included pre-residuary dispositions to his son and a marital trust for his wife. Upon her death, the greater of $15,000,000 or 25% of the trust principal would go to his son, with the remainder to two charitable lead trusts (CLTs) for the benefit of WCA Hospital, Jamestown Community College, and five public libraries. At that time, the testator was worth approximately $19,000,000.