Queens

Published on: January 4, 2016

Petitioner Brings Action to Vacate a Deed or Impress a Constructive Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

This action to vacate a deed or, in the alternative, impress a constructive trust, was originally commenced by the executor in Supreme Court, Nassau County, and was transferred to this court by order of Hon. Thomas P. Phelan dated October 21, 2005. RM, executor of the estate of MM, now moves for summary judgment. The respondent, CS, has cross-moved for summary judgment for a declaration that the transfer was a valid gift.

MM died on July 12, 2004 leaving a will dated May 29, 1987 which was admitted to probate by decree dated March 14, 2005. Letters testamentary issued to RM, the petitioner herein. In addition to RM and Catherine, MM was survived by three other children, Thomas, James and William.

Published on: January 3, 2016

Wife Brings Supreme Court Action Declaring Divorce Judgment Void

by Stephen Bilkis

In two matrimonial actions, the husband appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered January 31, 1989, in Action No. 1, which directed a joint trial of the actions in Westchester County and granted the wife leave to enter a money judgment in the sum of $21,150, representing arrears in maintenance, and (2) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated February 10, 1989, which, based upon the order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered January 31, 1989, referred Action No. 2 to the Supreme Court, Westchester County.

The wife instituted Action No. 1 in the Supreme Court, Westchester County, in 1986, seeking a judgment declaring null and void a Connecticut divorce judgment obtained by the husband in 1985, and ancillary relief. By order entered May 6, 1986, the Connecticut divorce judgment was held a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. By order dated June 27, 1986, the husband’s counterclaim for divorce in Action No. 1 was dismissed and he was directed to pay the wife permanent maintenance in the amount of $225 per week. It was uncontradicted that the husband unilaterally ceased payment of that maintenance in February 1987.

Published on: December 13, 2015

Petitoner Files Regarding Juvenile Delinquency Matter

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, Respondent moves this Court by way of Notice of Motion to with draw his admission with respect to this juvenile delinquency matter; and assuming that that part of the motion is granted, to restore the original petition “as it existed at the time of the admission;” and thereafter to proceed with the fact-finding hear-ing.

The Nassau County District Attorney’s Office originally charged this Respondent in the District Court of Nassau County with the offense of burglary in the first degree in violation of §140.30(2) of the Penal Law, a class B felony. Thereafter, and on May 30, 2006, a Judge of the District Court, with the consent of the District Attorney’s Office, and of the Defendant’s attorney, transferred this matter, for all purposes, to the Family Court.

Published on: December 9, 2015

Plaintiff Fails to State a Cause of Action

by Stephen Bilkis

The motion by defendant Board of Education of the Long Beach School District to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action is granted.

This is a pro se action for educational malpractice and the wrongful bringing of a neglect proceeding in the Family Court. Plaintiff and her husband have a 14 year old daughter who attends public school in Long Beach. Defendants are the Board of Education of the Long Beach School District and the Nassau County Department of Social Services (“DSS”).

Published on: November 16, 2015

Court Listens to Case to Terminate Parental Rights

by Stephen Bilkis

In a child neglect proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, and a related proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b to terminate parental rights, the mother appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated December 18, 2009, and (2) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the same court dated May 11, 2010, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that she had permanently neglected the subject child, terminated her parental rights as to the subject child, and placed the child in the guardianship and custody of the Nassau County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption.

“In proceedings to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, the agency must establish as a threshold matter that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship”. However, evidence of diligent efforts on the part of the agency are not required when “the parent has failed for a period of six months to keep the agency apprised of his or her location, provided that the court may consider the particular delays or barriers an incarcerated parent may experience in keeping the agency apprised of his or her location”.

Published on: November 16, 2015

Plaintiff Brings Motion to Renew Prior Motion to Dismiss

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, the Defendants bring this motion seeking to reargue and renew their prior motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211 and 327, which resulted in an order of this court denying the motion. The Plaintiff opposes the present motion. Before addressing the substance of the Defendants’ present motion it is worthwhile to review the nature of the underlying action, the Defendants’ prior motion and the claims made therein. A Nassau County lawyer said that this is an action to recover monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to an equipment rental agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by the defendant corporation and the Plaintiff’s assignor, guaranteed by the Defendant, the President of the corporation for the lease of telecommunication equipment and services.

This is an action to recover monies allegedly due and owing pursuant to an equipment rental agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by the defendant corporation and the Plaintiff’s assignor, guaranteed by the Defendant, the President of the corporation for the lease of telecommunication equipment and services.

Published on: November 15, 2015

Plaintiff Alleges Negligent Care of Individual Who was in Care of the Defendant

by Stephen Bilkis

This action arises from the defendant’s treatment in 1982 of plaintiff a 36-year-old individual who was born severely mentally retarded and blind. While he was treated by defendant, plaintiff was a resident of an intermediate care facility of the United Cerebral Palsy Association of Nassau, Inc. (hereinafter UCPA).

Plaintiff had been institutionalized his whole life and, from 1972 until 1981, resided at the Suffolk Developmental Center. In an effort to control his increasingly severe episodes of self-abusive behavior, in 1978 his primary physician at the facility, the doctor began administering Haldol to him. The doctor viewed Haldol as the “drug of choice” in eliminating such behavior. The drug was initially administered in low dosages, which were gradually increased in small increments, during which time plaintiff was carefully monitored for any signs of Haldol-related side effects. Over the course of the following 13 months, the dosage was gradually reduced again to that of four milligrams per day, considered optimal by the doctor inasmuch as the likelihood of side effects was low and his severe self-injurious behavior was contained.

Published on: November 14, 2015

Court Weighs in on Reasonable Certainty Standard Regarding Evidence

by Stephen Bilkis

The instant appeal provides us with an occasion to discuss in detail the “reasonable certainty” evidentiary standard of CPLR 4545 (c) that governs collateral source hearings, as decisional authority on the subject is sparse.

During the early morning hours of a rainy January 13, 1995, the plaintiff MK was riding in the front passenger seat of a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant KOP. As KOP proceeded along Quaker Meeting House Road in Farmingdale at approximately 30 miles per hour, the car hydroplaned off the road and crashed into a tree, causing MK to sustain fractures to her ankle and C2 vertebra. Subsequently, MK commenced this action against KOP, as well as the defendant County of Nassau, alleging as the bases for recovery KOP’s negligent operation of the vehicle and the County’s negligent road design. Prior to trial, in an order dated August 26, 2004, the Supreme Court determined that the County was collaterally estopped from arguing that the road was not negligently designed based upon prior decisions of this Court in Furino v County of Nassau and Zawacki v County of Nassau. After a trial on the issue of liability, the jury found, on October 21, 2004, that the negligence of both KOP and the County were substantial factors contributing to the accident’s occurrence, and apportioned 13% of fault to KOP and 87% of fault to the County.

Published on: November 9, 2015

Petitioner Moves for Dismissal of Charges

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, defendant moves this Court for an order, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 170.30(1)(f), dismissing the charge of Assault in the Third Degree on the grounds that there exists a legal impediment to conviction.

The Complainant executed a misdemeanor information on December 8, 1990, alleging that her former husband intentionally caused physical injury to her on December 8, 1990 at 6:10 p.m. in the Village of Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.

On December 10, 1990, Complainant filed a Family Offense Petition in the Family Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester, alleging that Respondent on December 8, 1990 committed acts against her which constituted harassment and assault in the third degree. The specific allegations of the petition concerned the same incident that formed the basis for the misdemeanor information.

Published on: November 3, 2015

Court Hears Disturbing Case of Abuse and Neglect

by Stephen Bilkis

At issue on this appeal is whether the City of New York and a child protective service, defendant Louise Wise Services (LWS), sued herein as Louise Wise Agency, are insulated by immunity from liability for injuries allegedly sustained by children, both in connection with their judicial placement into the foster care system and subsequently, while in the custody of various foster homes. This Court concludes that although these defendants are insulated from liability with respect to the initial placement, they are answerable for any injuries sustained as the result of the failure to adequately supervise foster parents to ensure that children entrusted to their care are not subjected to mistreatment.

The plaintiffs Deborah (Debbie) and Sean M. are siblings, born on December 29, 1976 and January 16, 1980, respectively. They were removed from the child custody of their natural parents in February 1982 after it was determined that the five-year-old Debbie had contracted gonorrhea of the throat. The children were first placed with defendant Catholic Guardian Society and, after approximately two months, were transferred to the custody of defendant LWS. At her deposition, Debbie testified, inter alia, that in the first foster home, she was kept in her room “hour after hour.” In the second home, she was beaten and pushed into a glass, cutting her wrist; the foster mother told Debbie to say that she had fallen off a bicycle. Ms. Vasquez, the third foster parent, pulled her hair, struck her and routinely confined her to a room; a male child in the same home fondled her, at least once, between the legs. Debbie was then between five and seven years old. In another home on Long Island, the foster parent was not abusive, but the older children used to have “oral sex parties” with Debbie. She was ultimately returned to her mother’s home, where she was subjected to constant physical abuse by her mother and stepfather.

The complaint, dated September 5, 1985, alleges that plaintiffs were subjected to physical and sexual abuse, both within and outside the foster care system. The first and second causes of action allege that the City of New York and its agencies, the Human Resources Administration and the Department of Social Services (collectively, the City), failed to act on reports of abuse and neglect received since January 1977 by taking timely and appropriate action to remove, respectively, plaintiff Debbie M. and plaintiff Sean M. from the custody of their biological parents. The third and fourth causes of action allege that from the time they were placed in foster care in February 1982 until March 1984, plaintiffs were subjected to abuse and neglect in a series of foster homes and were denied adequate medical care. It is further alleged that after Family Court returned them to their mother’s home, plaintiffs were subjected to further abuse and neglect. The complaint asserts that defendants breached their duties to investigate complaints of abuse and neglect, to provide a clean and safe environment for the children and to furnish appropriate medical treatment.