Queens

Published on: August 7, 2014

Court Rules in Paternity Suit

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said this proceeding before the court is a petition by X for an order declaring him to be the father of PJ who was born on 16 July 1999 and for an order setting his child support obligation. A, the child’s mother, opposes the petition. B, married to A at the time of PJ’s conception and birth and continues to be married to her today, also opposes the paternity petition. The Attorney for the Child also opposes the paternity petition.

On 7 January 2004, X filed his petition. At around this time, PJ was four-and-a-half years old. For a variety of reasons not having anything to do with X, the case took an inordinately long time to conclude. A and B together successfully evaded service for more than 19 months. When the Magistrate learned that A was married when PJ was born, she added B as a necessary party, issued a summons for him to appear. The court referred the matter to a judge to address the issues of equitable estoppel and presumption of legitimacy.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said X and his sister, M, testified in favor of X’s petition. A and B testified in opposition to the petition and in support of their affirmative defenses of the presumption of legitimacy and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Having considered the evidence and had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Published on: August 5, 2014

Court Looks at Whether Respondent may be Subject of a Summary Licensee Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in January of 1989, the petitioner purchased a premises known as Pine brook Avenue, New York. A certified copy of the deed to the premises was offered into evidence, although the respondent concedes that her name does not appear on the deed or mortgage. The monthly mortgage payment for the premises at issue is $1,350 per month. In April of 1994, the parties had a child out of wedlock. In December of 1997, the respondent and the parties’ minor child moved into the subject premises with the petitioner. At the time that the respondent moved into the premises in question, there was no written agreement between the parties with regard to the subject premises and the respondent was not married to the petitioner. However, the parties were involved in a relationship, as boyfriend and girlfriend, and had been involved for some time. In July of 1999, the parties’ second child was born out of wedlock. Sometime after the birth of the parties’ second child, in early 2000, the relationship between the parties failed.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, soon thereafter, the respondent brought a Family Court proceeding for child support of the parties’ two minor children. As a result of this proceeding, a Family Court order of support was issued. In May of 2000, the respondent commenced another Family Court proceeding. This proceeding was to obtain a protective order. On December 1, 2000, an order of protection was ordered by the Nassau County Family Court, in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner, upon default of the petitioner. Shortly after the order of protection was issued, the petitioner demanded that the respondent leave the premises.

A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, in December of 2000, the petitioner served the respondent a 10-day notice to vacate the premises. In January of 2001, the petitioner commenced a holdover proceeding to obtain exclusive possession of the premises in question, on the ground that the respondent is a “licensee” whose license has been terminated by the proper notice and service under RPAPL 713 (7). The respondent waived any defects in the 10-day notice, the petition and any jurisdictional defects. At the commencement of this proceeding there was no child support or custody order in effect. The order of protection, however, was in effect.

Published on: August 1, 2014

Husband Seeks a Downward Modification of Child Support

by Stephen Bilkis

New York Family Lawyer said in accordance with a separation agreement, the husband was obligated to pay $750 per month to the wife as child support for the two infant of their marriage. The couple was granted a conversion divorce and the separation agreement was incorporated but not merged into the judgment.

In February 1985 the husband moved in Nassau County Supreme Court for a downward modification of child support and the wife moved in the same court for enforcement of the judgment and arrears. In settlement of both motions, a so ordered stipulation was entered in Nassau County Supreme Court which determined an allocation of the proceeds upon the sale of the marital premises. The stipulation was read into the record and commenced that both of the proceedings presently before the Court based upon the wife’s application seeking various forms of enforcement relief against the husband, and husband’s application for a downward modification of child support obligation are hereby settled on terms and conditions. It is noted that, pursuant to the terms of the stipulation and settlement, the former marital residence was sold and the husband received the sum of approximately $50,000 from the proceeds, the wife received in excess of $100,000 and the sum of $38,000 was placed in an escrow account to secure the future payment of child support.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said in August 28, 1985, the husband again sought to reduce his child support payments, this https://familylawyer.1800nynylaw.com/new-york-divorce-lawyer.htmltime in the Family Court of Nassau County, and the matter was referred to a Hearing Examiner.

Published on: July 29, 2014

Court Discusses Concept of Equitable Estoppel

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said a man and a woman appeared for conference before the Support Magistrate when the respondent man requested genetic testing be conducted before admitting to paternity of the children. The court file reflects that the man told the Support Magistrate that, although the children refer to him as dad, he is requesting genetic testing because he would like to be sure. The Support Magistrate then assigned a Law Guardian, and the matter was adjourned for further proceedings.

On the adjourned date, the court file shows that the Law Guardian advised the Support Magistrate that the children recognize the man to be their father and that he spent holidays with them. The man renewed his request for genetic testing before admitting to paternity. The matter was referred to the Family Court for determination as to whether the petitioner woman could invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the man’s request for genetic testing.

The court then set a schedule for submission of papers on the issue. The woman filed a notice of motion requesting that an order be made estopping the man, pursuant to Family Court Act from obtaining genetic testing to disprove paternity of the children.

Published on: July 26, 2014

Court Decides Disposition of Family Residence

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in a matrimonial action in which the plaintiff wife had previously been granted a divorce, the defendant husband appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated August 25, 1981, which granted plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of a receiver of all defendant’s property in the State of New York, “particularly all of his right, title and interest in and to the former marital residence”, named plaintiff as the receiver, awarded plaintiff a counsel fee of $750, and denied defendant’s cross motion to, inter alia, suspend prospective payments of alimony and child support, on the ground that plaintiff unreasonably withheld visitation, and (2) from a further order of the same court, dated October 22, 1981, which denied his motion to renew.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said in a stipulation settling their differences, which was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce, the parties agreed, inter alia, that plaintiff would have exclusive possession of the marital residence, owned by them as tenants by the entirety. However, plaintiff was given the right to elect to sell the marital residence. The defendant further agreed to pay plaintiff $50 per week alimony and a total of $100 per week child support. The stipulation also provided: “Each party shall own free of any claim or right of the other all of the items of property, real, personal and mixed, of any kind, nature or description, and wheresoever’s situated, which are now owned by him or her”.

A New York Divorce Lawyer said that, in January, 1981, defendant petitioned the Family Court, Nassau County, for an order suspending his child support obligations on the ground that plaintiff had unreasonably denied him visitation with the children. By order dated January 28, 1981, his application was denied. A Nassau Visitation Lawyer said that, in June, 1981, defendant made a second application in the Family Court, Nassau County, for suspension of alimony and/or maintenance, on the ground, inter alia, that he was unreasonably denied visitation. By order dated July 17, 1981, his application was, again, denied and a judgment for arrears was entered against him.

Published on: March 26, 2014

Court Rules on Custody Battle

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in this Family case, in related child custody proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Kings County, as, without a hearing, awarded custody of the parties’ children to the father.

According to a New York Child Custody Lawyer, the Family Court entered a finding of child neglect against the mother pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act upon the mother’s admission, at a fact-finding hearing, to allegations that she tested positive for marijuana, obtained Xanax from a neighbor, and used both Xanax and marijuana on a regular basis. Additionally, the Family Court, conducted a dispositional hearing, and was concluded thereafter.

At that hearing, evidence was adduced that supported a finding of the mother’s continued drug use, and additional evidence demonstrated the mother’s history of mental health issues, inappropriate conduct during visitation, and inappropriate conduct in making, or having her daughter make, false allegations against the father.

Published on: March 13, 2014

Court Reviews Case Regarding Jurisdiction Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

This proceeding was brought by the petitioner under subdivision 1 of section 332 of the Election Law to cancel the enrollment of the respondent as a member of the Democratic party of the county of Kings.

A New York Family Lawyer said that the petition alleges that respondent in a verified affidavit, requested that his enrollment be transferred from the thirty-seventh Election District of the nineteenth Assembly District to the fortieth Election District of the nineteenth Assembly District.

The respondent by lease became the tenant of premises in Kings County for a term of four years, which term has since expired, but the occupancy thereof has continued under the terms of the lease either by automatic renewals of terms of one year or under the emergency rent laws. The family of the respondent apparently at all times since the tenancy began of said premises has remained in occupancy thereof to the present time. It is indicated by the evidence that such family consists of the wife of the respondent and an unmarried son. The respondent is a lawyer engaged in practice in Kings County and, judging from the photograph introduced in evidence of the premises, it would appear that he either enjoys a good practice or is a man of some substance.

Published on: March 5, 2014

Court Discusses Case Involving Juvenile Delinquent

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said a fifteen-year old boy has petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the judges of the Family Court from reopening a fact-finding hearing by which he may be adjudged a juvenile delinquent, on the grounds that he will thereby be subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, and contrary to the New York State Constitution.

The petitioner contends that he had already been exposed to jeopardy of his liberty in the Family Court when a witness was sworn and testified against him in an adjudicatory hearing, based upon a petition which charged him with criminal assault. In the midst of that proceeding the court declared a mistrial, over the objections of the law guardian for the petitioner. In fact, the presiding judge ordered the mistrial, Sua sponte, and for his own convenience. The judge remarked as he did so that he is disqualifying himself and declaring a mistrial.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said the next day, the presiding judge, on his own initiative, recalled the case and abrogated the mistrial order for the purpose of reinstating the adjudicatory hearing against the accused. The law guardian again objected and raised the constitutional issue of double jeopardy as a bar.

Published on: January 3, 2014

Mother Tries to Regain Custody of Children in Foster Care

by Stephen Bilkis

A permanent neglect petition was filed by the petitioner adoption service. At that time the child was four years old; for the preceding two and a half years she had been in the custody first of the Bureau of Child Welfare, and thereafter, with the adoption. The child, who is now seven years old, has, since the latter date, been in the care of the same foster parents.

A New York Family Lawyer said that the voluminous record which covers 19 hearings, beginning on June 1969, portrays a picture of an aggressive, paranoid and immature mother who interspersed long periods of neglect by failure to maintain contact with the supervising agency for visitation with sudden, hysterical demands that the child be returned to her. Attempts by caseworkers to contact the respondent were frustrated by her constant changes of address, most of which were not communicated to the agency.

On one occasion, when the Bureau of Child Welfare permitted the child to be taken to the respondent’s home, the infant was admitted to a hospital as a battered child four days later. Thereafter, or in August 1971, the Family Court judge, in response to the respondent’s application for the immediate return of the child, ordered the adoption service to permit 15 visits by the respondent up to October 1971; on that latter date she was to be permitted to take the child home for the weekend. Nevertheless, the respondent made only two regular visits prior to October 1; on that date she insisted on taking the child home a week earlier than scheduled. She was permitted to do so, but refused to return the child on the following Monday. This resulted in the issuance of a warrant and the arrest of the respondent.

Published on: December 18, 2013

Petitioner Claims Invalid Service of Summons

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said this is a proceeding for support pursuant to Article 4 of the Family Court Act. The clerk of the court mailed a summons to the respondent, directing him to appear for a hearing. No attempt at personal or substituted service was made prior to the mailing of the summons.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the respondent has appeared specially and moved, pursuant to Section 3211(a) (8) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, to dismiss the petition on the ground that service by mail in the first instance does not comply with the requirements of Section 427 of the Family Court

A Queens Child Custody Lawyer said Section 427 provides as follows: ‘(a) Service of a summons and petition shall be made by delivery of a true copy thereof to the person summoned at least three days before the time stated therein for appearance. If so requested by the respondent or by a parent or other person legally responsible for his care, the court shall not proceed with the hearing or proceeding earlier than seven days after such service.