Staten Island

Published on: March 24, 2014

Court Listens to Case Where Child is Put into Foster Care

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, a New York Family Lawyer said the appellant is the mother of the three children who are the subjects of these neglect proceedings. In the early morning hours in February 2009, the children, then aged six years, four years, and nine months, respectively, were found by a police officer wandering the streets alone. The next day, a Children’s Services filed petitions in the Family Court, Queens County, alleging that the mother neglected her children as a result of this incident. The Family Court issued an order of protection prohibiting all contact between the mother and her children, with the exception of child services-supervised visitation.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that the children were then paroled to the care of their nonrespondent father and his mother, with whom the father lived. Thereafter, the mother orally requested a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028 for the return of her children. Ultimately, the Family Court denied the mother’s request for a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing on the ground that a hearing was not required because the children were paroled to the father’s care. Instead, the Family Court granted an application of the attorney for the children for a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify the order of protection. While a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing must be held within three court days after the application, there is no requirement that a Family Court Act § 1061 hearing be held within any period of time. The Family Court Act § 1061 hearing was not held for nearly 1 1/2 years, during which time the children remained in their father’s care. The Family Court Act § 1061 hearing was eventually scheduled for the same day that oral argument on the instant appeal was scheduled before this Court. Several months later, while the determination of this appeal was pending, by order dated October 20, 2010, the Family Court returned the children to the mother.

A Staten Island Family Lawyer said the question presented on this appeal is whether a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing is triggered by the removal of a child from the home of one parent and temporary placement into the custody of another parent or relative, or whether such hearing is triggered only where a child is placed into government-administered foster care. Although the Family Court returned the children to the mother while the determination of this appeal was pending, the Court finds that this case nevertheless presents a justiciable controversy, and we reverse the order denying the mother’s application for a Family Court Act § 1028 hearing.

Published on: March 12, 2014

Court Reviews Unusual Case Regarding Suspected Poisoning of Decedent

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, the defendant stands convicted of murder in the first degree upon an indictment which charges that the defendant willfully, feloniously and of malice aforethought poisoned the deceased, by giving and administered to her a quantity of poison, to wit, strychnine, and as a result of said poisoning said deceased died in December1943.’

A New York Family Lawyer said that the defendant is a pharmacist who for a period of years had been employed at a drugstore operated by the witness. He married the decedent in 1940 when she was twenty years old and he was thirteen years her senior. Although the record does not tell whether during the three years of their life together a child was born of the marriage, it does appear that the decedent was pregnant at the time of her death and that her pregnancy was not accompanied by unusual illness.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said one evening, when the defendant was on duty at his place of business and the decedent was alone in their apartment she was called upon by her sister. At that time there were no indications that the decedent was ill. Within an hour after her sister left the decedent, the witness who lived on the same floor heard a strange noise which led her to open a door leading into the outside hallway. As she did so she saw the decedent standing in the doorway of the apartment apparently in distress. Upon going to her assistance she noted that the decedent’s body had stiffened, her face was drawn, ‘her eyes were like big saucers, very big, and she kept cringing like that, shivering, her body shaking.’ Her hands were clenched and drawn in toward her chest and her arms were bent from the elbows. After the witness had summoned by telephone the defendant, the decedent’s sister, and the decedent’s attending physician, she was aided by two other neighbors in placing the decedent on a bed. Although the decedent was conscious her legs had stiffened with toes turned in and her hands were in a claw-like position with fingers, wrists and elbows bent. She repeatedly cried out ‘I’m dying,’ ‘The sooner I die the better,’ ‘Let me die now,’ ‘I’m in terrible pain,’ ‘Don’t touch my feet.’ When the doctor arrived he found the decedent in a convulsion.

Published on: March 4, 2014

Court Decides a Case Involving Double Jeopardy

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said that, in this Article 78 proceeding the petitioner, a boy 15 years of age, seeks an order prohibiting the respondent, Judges of the Family Court of the County of Kings, from re-conducting a fact-finding hearing upon the ground that to do so would place him in double jeopardy.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that, the juvenile delinquency petition made by a police officer, alleged in substance, on information and belief, that on November 19, 1968 the petitioner, while acting in concert with two other youths, did take and operate a Chevrolet truck, without the owner’s consent or permission, and did drive the truck across the street into two other parked vehicles, as a result of which all three vehicles were damaged. It was further alleged that the acts of the petitioner, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of Unauthorized Use of Vehicle.

A Kings Order of Protection Lawyer said that, the fact-finding hearing, at which both sides were represented by counsel and had indicated readiness to proceed, commenced on January 14, 1969. The police officer testified that while on patrol he received information, gave chase, and apprehended the petitioner who was running on the sidewalk and took him into custody. He did not see the petitioner in the truck. Confronted with this situation the prosecutor asked the court for a moment and then said ‘After further consultation’ but he got no further. The court declared ‘All right. Mistrial.’ Petitioner objected to a mistrial. The court then continued questioning the officer who reiterated his prior testimony. Finally, the prosecutor said he was not ready, ‘That’s the way it stands now’, but added that he did have a witness to establish that petitioner was in the truck. The court said ‘One adjournment. Mistrial granted. Adjourned.’ It then developed that the missing witness was the son of the owner of the truck who was not present because he was tending to the business. The owner indicated a willingness to telephone his son to see if he was able to come down. The petitioner’s attorney stated to the court that a double jeopardy question was involved. The hearing ended with the court’s statement ‘Adjourned to 2/7/69. Mistrial granted. Police officer needs a witness.’ The court endorsed that language on the back of the petition.

Published on: January 2, 2014

Court Listens to Habeas Corpus Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

In a family related case, a habeas corpus proceeding with respect to custody of petitioner’s eight-year-old son, the appeal is from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, A prior interim order had been made by the Supreme Court, Kings County, referring the proceeding to the Family Court and granting temporary custody of the child to appellants, with two-hour periods of visitation on Saturdays and Wednesdays to petitioner at appellants’ home. A New York Family Lawyer said the order under review modified said prior order of the Supreme Court so as to grant visitation to both parents of the child, at or away from appellants’ home, for three hours on Saturdays, subject to certain conditions. According to a Kings County visitation attorney, the permission to appeal from the order of the Family Court is hereby granted. Thus, the court Order was reversed, without costs, and petitioner’s application to modify the order of the Supreme Court denied.

In addition, a New York Custody Lawyer said the Court stated that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to modify the visitation provisions ordered by the Supreme Court in view of petitioner’s past conduct, an apparent inability on the part of her husband to control her actions at times, and a failure of proof that circumstances had changed since the date of the Supreme Court’s order so as to adversely affect the welfare of the child. Our determination is, of course, without prejudice to the issues to be determined after trial, which, as of the time of the making of the order under review, was scheduled for September 17, 1971.

A Staten Island Family Lawyer said an another family case, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 for grandparent visitation, the grandmother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated February 24, 2009, which, after a hearing, dismissed the petition.

Published on: December 19, 2013

Wife Seeks Sanctions Against Husband for Frivolous Behavior

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Familly Lawyer said the couple was married and has seven children, one of whom is emancipated. The respondent husband, a physician, incorporated his successful plastic surgery practice as a subchapter corporation, for which he is the sole shareholder. The couple separated and a temporary order of custody was issued in Family Court by which they were to spend equal amounts of time with each of their children, and petitioner wife petitioned for child and spousal support. In April 1999, Family Court issued a temporary support order requiring the husband to pay—on a monthly basis—child support of $10,000 and spousal support of $1,000.

In May 1999, the wife filed for divorce and all issues regarding child support were consolidated in Supreme Court. Subsequently, the husband successfully moved to dismiss the divorce action. However, in its dismissal order the court also granted, among other things, a money judgment against the husband for arrearages in child and spousal support, continued the temporary support order and referred matters regarding child support back to Family Court. A New York Custody Lawyer said that on the husband’s appeal of those latter portions of the dismissal order, the Court left intact the husband’s obligations under the temporary support order including arrearages, and referred final issues of child support to Family Court.

In January 2004, a hearing was commenced in Family Court on the child support issues, resulting in an order by the Support Magistrate which, based on the disparate incomes of the parties, required the husband to pay 80% of all of the children’s expenses and required the wife to pay 20%. The Support Magistrate also ordered the husband to pay monthly child support of $4,491 and monthly spousal support of $1,500, and denied the requests of both parties for counsel fees; finding that the husband’s violation of the temporary support order was not willful, the court denied the wife’s petition to hold him in contempt. Both parties then filed objections to the Support Magistrate’s order, although only the wife specifically objected to the denial of counsel fees.

Published on: October 28, 2013

Court Discusses Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said the court has before it the petitioner’s objections to the order of Support Magistrate, dated March 7, 2007, dismissing the petition filed herein. A New York Child Support Lawyer said that, pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Family Court Act Article 5-B), the petitioner (a resident of Canada), commenced this proceeding by filing a petition seeking the establishment of an order of paternity and child support. The petition alleged that the parties were engaged in a same-sex relationship between August 1989 and January 1995. During their relationship, the parties made plans to conceive and raise a child together. In December 1993, the petitioner became impregnated via artificial insemination. On September 20, 1994, the petitioner gave birth to a child.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that shortly after the birth of the child the parties’ relationship ended and petitioner, along with the child moved to Montreal, Canada. Petitioner claims that despite her requests, the respondent has not provided any support for the child. Petitioner seeks a declaration of parentage and an order of child support retroactive to the date of the birth of the child.

A New York Order of Protection Lawyer said that, on March 6, 2007, the parties appeared before Support Magistrate. Petitioner appeared via telephone, respondent personally and with counsel. Prior to conducting a hearing, upon oral application by counsel for respondent, the Support Magistrate dismissed the petition, finding that under the facts of the case and the laws of the State of New York, the court could not grant an order of filiation. The question of the appropriate amount of child support was never reached.

Published on: October 19, 2013

Foster Mother Moves for Custody

by Stephen Bilkis

The child of herein parties was born in 1995, with a positive toxicology for cocaine. He was removed from his mother’s custody shortly after birth. Her parental rights were eventually terminated, as were the father’s in 1999. A New York Family Lawyer said both parents’ terminations were based on permanent neglect. During the time that the Department of Social Services (DSS) was providing services for the mother, the father was filing at least four custody proceedings. All of the father’s petitions were dismissed by the Family Court judge without a hearing. According to the trial court, the petitions were “dismissed due to [the father’s] unwillingness to partake in services recommended by [DSS].” For the years from 1995 to 1998, the father received one hour of DSS-supervised child visitation each week.

A New York Family attorney said that concerning the termination of parental rights finding, the Appellate Division held that DSS made no effort to satisfy its burden of showing that it had formulated a realistic plan that was tailored to fit the father’s circumstances. It also held that the Family Court judge “repeatedly thwarted the father’s efforts to establish the lack of any reasonable basis for the plan that was put in place. Obviously, the petition should have been dismissed at the conclusion of DSS’ case, if not earlier.” A New York Child Custody Lawyer said the Appellate Division, in finding that the Family Court judge had demonstrated hostility toward the father and his attorney, ordered that all further proceedings be conducted before a different judge.

Upon remand, the Court returned custody of the child to the father and entered a series of child visitation orders to facilitate the transition of the child back into the father’s home. During this period of time, the foster mother filed petitions seeking visitation and custody rights to the child. The Court rejected the foster mother’s claims. It found that there was no statutory, common law or constitutional basis to grant child visitation to a nonbiological, former custodian. The Court reserved on the question of whether the child has an independent constitutional right to seek visitation with his former foster mother and allowed the parties and the Law Guardian time to brief the issue. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said this decision answers that question in the affirmative. From the child’s birth in 1995 until April 2000, when he was returned to his father, the boy had lived with the foster mother for all of his life but for a few weeks.

Published on: October 9, 2013

Court Discusses Statutory Duties of Law Guardian

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Order of protection case, the Law Guardian was relieved and new counsel assigned to represent the child’s interests. Respondent mother’s counsel asserts that during the fact-finding hearing, while the caseworker for the Administration for Children’s Services was testifying, the Law Guardian read a People/Us magazine under her desk and text messages on her cell phone. In addition, counsel for respondent mother notes that the Law Guardian asked the caseworker no questions during cross-examination. According to counsel for respondent mother, “the last straw” was during an off-the-record bench conference, when the Law Guardian stated her support for the agency’s position. A New York Family Lawyer said at that point, counsel contends that he became very upset, because the Law Guardian appeared to fail to pay attention to the testimony during the trial, yet took a position against his client.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the motion is opposed by the Law Guardian. She emphatically denies that she was reading a magazine, although she admits that there was one on her desk. She also denies that she was reading text messages asserting, “there is no cell phone service in the court.” The Law Guardian asserts that she has diligently represented her now five-year-old client’s interests. Specifically, she asserts that she met with her client twice, conducted an extensive and thorough investigation and made a determination to advocate for a resolution that she believed to be in the child’s best interests. She asserts that although she did not wish to cross-examine the caseworker, she was paying very close attention and is knowledgeable about all of the facts and circumstances at issue in this case.

Counsel for respondent maternal great-grandmother has submitted an affirmation which essentially supports the observations of respondent mother’s counsel about the Law Guardian’s actions, although he takes no position in support of, or opposition to, the motion. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said after having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court finds the affirmation submitted by respondent mother’s counsel devoid of viable evidence indicating any bias on the part of the Law Guardian, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to diligently represent the child’s interests or other recognized grounds for disqualification. The motion is denied.

Published on: October 6, 2013

Court Discusses Dual Representation Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Plaintiff A is the court appointed article 81 financial guardian for B. He is also the co-trustee of the B Family Trust. A New York Family Lawyer said these appointments were made only after the original action was brought. A has now interposed a third amended complaint on behalf of his ward. Defendant C as trustee and certain business defendants have brought a pre-answer motion to dismiss the fifth through fourteenth causes of action asserted in the third amended complaint. C has now joined in that motion in her individual capacity. Defendant D has separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to her. Defendant E separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to him.

F law firm separately moved to be relieved as counsel of record for certain defendants. This motion has already been denied by the court. A cross moved to: disqualify the F law firm; appoint a receiver; appoint a successor trustee in place of C of the B Family Trust; hold a hearing on whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for G; strike D’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss and strike C’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss. A New York Custody Lawyer said that subsequently withdrew his application to have a receiver appointed. Although the parties represented to the court that the only relief left in the cross-motion pertained to disqualification of the F law firm, other requested relief has not been formally withdrawn. Thus, still outstanding is A’s request for the appointment of a successor trustee, a guardian ad litem hearing and to strike reply papers on the motions to dismiss.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said that because all of the motions and cross-motion are substantially interrelated and rely on similar facts and arguments made sometimes in overlapping papers, they are consolidated for consideration and determination in this single decision. At the outset the court rejects arguments that the court should refuse to consider any of the relief requested in A’s cross-motion because it was made at a time when a stay of the proceedings was in effect. Regardless of whether the temporary restraining order contained in the August 27, 2007 Order to Show Cause precluded the cross-motion at the time it was originally interposed, that TRO had long expired by the time the cross-motion was actually submitted to the court. In the interim, and certainly by the time of submission, all parties had been given an opportunity to oppose the relief requested in the cross-motion on the merits. Thus the relief requested by A will be considered on the merits.

Published on: September 25, 2013

Court Decides Case for Contempt of Court for Failure to Pay Child Support

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated November 4, 1999, which, in effect, confirmed a determination of the same court, dated September 13, 1999, that he had willfully failed to obey an order of the same court, dated December 9, 1996, and thereupon committed him to a term of incarceration of 120 days, unless he purged himself of his contempt by paying the sum of $10,000 towards arrears of child support.

A Suffolk Child Support Lawyer said that, pursuant to an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated December 9, 1996, the appellant was obligated to pay $576 per month in child support. The appellant allegedly has not made any payment under that order, and the Commissioner of Social Services filed a violation of child support order petition. A hearing was conducted on September 13, 1999, although the appellant was not represented by counsel and was not advised of his right to have counsel present. A Suffolk Family Lawyer said that, the Hearing Examiner found the appellant guilty of a willful violation of the support order, and on November 4, 1999, the Family Court denied his objections, confirmed the Hearing Officer’s findings, and committed the appellant to a term of incarceration. A Suffolk Child Support Lawyer said that, the appellant contends that he was not properly notified of his right to counsel and therefore his consent to go forward at the hearing was not given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

A New York Custody Lawyer said the issue in this case is whether court erred in citing the father in contempt for not paying the ordered child support.