Suffolk County

Published on: December 12, 2015

Respondent Claims Petition is Fatally Defective, Made Wholly on Information and Belief

by Stephen Bilkis

The respondent appears specially, by counsel, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition is fatally defective, in that it is made wholly on information and belief.

The petition charges the respondent with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed certain acts in violation of the Penal Law as well as of a local municipal ordinance. The petitioner alleges that he is a person authorized to institute such a proceeding under article 7 of the Family Court Act by reason of the fact that he is one who suffered injury as a result of the said illegal acts of the respondent.

Published on: December 11, 2015

Plaintiff Alleges Former Husband Comitted 3d Degree Assault

by Stephen Bilkis

In this family case, defendant moves this Court for an order, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 170.30(1)(f), dismissing the charge of Assault in the Third Degree on the grounds that there exists a legal impediment to conviction.

That Complainant executed a misdemeanor information on December 8, 1990, alleging that her former husband intentionally caused physical injury to her on December 8, 1990 at 6:10 p.m. in the Village of Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.

Published on: November 23, 2015

Court Rules on Guardianship Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner, Delmi Y. (hereinafter referred to as “petitioner”), has filed a petition with this Court requesting that she be appointed as the guardian of her twelve-year-old nephew Orlin C. Y. (hereinafter referred to as “minor child”). The attorney for the minor child joins in the petitioner’s application and requests that this Court additionally issue an Order of Special Findings which would enable the minor child to petition the Department of Homeland Security for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(27)(J) and 8 Code of Federal Regulations §204.11. The respondent Carmen Y. is the biological mother of the minor child. The respondent Juan C. is the biological father of the minor child.

In addition to the petition, the petitioner and the minor child’s attorney have submitted the following: an affidavit from the minor child, a birth certificate for the minor child, a translated document signed by the minor child’s mother consenting to the petitioner having custody of the minor child, an affidavit indicating the efforts made to locate the minor child’s father, a document from the Ministry of the Public Attorney General of the Republic of El Salvador, and various other paperwork written in Spanish. Also provided was a Memorandum of Law, and a letter from the minor child’s attorney indicating that Federal Immigration Removal Proceedings are currently pending against the minor child. This Court ordered an investigation by the Nassau County Department of Social Services (hereinafter referred to as “D.S.S.”) regarding this matter. As part of their investigation, D.S.S. interviewed the minor child and the petitioner. D.S.S. provided this Court with a detailed report of the interviews and their findings.

Published on: November 18, 2015

Court Rules on Petitioner’s Request for Tax Exempt Status

by Stephen Bilkis

The issue here is whether renewal applications for four properties located in the Village of Freeport, Nassau County, are entitled to tax exemption pursuant to Real Property Tax Law § 462. We affirm the order of the Appellate Division holding that the properties are tax exempt.

On September 24, 1999, respondent, Word of Life Ministries, submitted to Nassau County renewal applications for tax exempt status for four properties on the ground that they were used as residences by “officiating clergymen.” The applications mistakenly answered “yes” in response to the question whether the properties were used for purposes other than as residences of “the officiating clergy” stating that they were used as the residences of assistant pastors. Before the tax authorities made a decision, respondent corrected the applications before the County to state that the properties were used as residences for officiating clergymen. After reviewing the applications, Nassau County concluded that the properties were not tax exempt under RPTL 462. Respondent submitted similar applications to the Village of Freeport on July 25, 2000, but the Village rejected respondent’s attempt to correct its mistake. These applications were denied on or about August 15, 2000.

Published on: November 10, 2015

Petitioner Requests Entry of Money Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an application pursuant to Section 460 of the Family Court Act for an order directing the entry of a money judgment in the sum of Three Thousand Three Hundred Twenty ($3,320.00) Dollars, plus costs, on arrears reserved generally by this Court on August 12, 1974.

Petitioner filed a USDL petition on April 4, 1972, in the County of Orange, State of California. Said petition was forwarded to the Nassau County Family Court in accordance with Article 3-A, Section 37, of the Domestic Relations Law. Respondent, a resident of Nassau County, State of New York, appeared on May 12, 1972, and upon his consent, a final order of support was entered ordering respondent to pay the sum of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars per week through the Probation Department for the support and maintenance of one child, effective May 15, 1972.

Published on: October 10, 2015

Petitioner Says Law Violates Equal Protection Clause

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiffs, District Court Judges of the Suffolk County District Court, seek among other things, a judgment declaring the perpetuation of an unfavorable salary disparity between the plaintiffs and the Judges of the only other District Court in the State, that of adjoining Nassau County, violative of the equal protection provisions of our Federal and State Constitutions. As a supplementary item of relief plaintiffs also sought a judgment covering the resulting unconstitutional salary differential commencing with April 1, 1977, the date the Judges became employees of the State’s unified court system. 2 Named as defendant were the State, its Comptroller, the Chief Administrator of the Courts (both in this capacity and as the representative of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference) and the County of Suffolk.

The parties having stipulated that the facts were not in dispute, on a motion for summary judgment Supreme Court, Westchester County, sitting at Special Term, found merit in the constitutional claim and, in a judgment dated July 29, 1980, though it dismissed the complaint against the county, declared that the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection will have been violated unless the other defendants (hereinafter “the State”) took “all appropriate steps to end the salary disparity” prior to October 1, 1980. On cross appeals to the Appellate Division, Second Department, the State directed its attention to the declaration on constitutionality of the salary differential, while the plaintiffs addressed only the correctness of so much of the judgment as allowed the disparity to continue until October 1, 1980. The Appellate Division, 82 A.D.2d 441, 442 N.Y.S.2d 80, applying the rational basis test, as had the Supreme Court, and agreeing that the case presented a potential constitutional violation, modified the judgment by substituting April 1, 1982 for October 1, 1980 as the target date for elimination of the disparity and otherwise affirmed.

Published on: October 8, 2015

Respondent Contends Evidence Used Against Him was Incorrect

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appeal by defendant from: (1) a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered August 15, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of (felony) murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and of grand larceny and assault (both in the second degree), and after a jury recommendation, imposing sentence of life imprisonment on the conviction of murder in the first degree; and (2) from ‘each and every intermediate order’ made in the action.

After the crimes were committed, the defendant fled to California, where he was arrested and searched. Immediately after the arrest, the California police searched and found two revolvers in the automobile which the defendant had rented.

Published on: October 3, 2015

Court Decides Private Placement Adoption Action

by Stephen Bilkis

This private placement adoption action presents a number of intertwined legal issues that highlight the shortcomings of the private placement adoption statutes in New York State. The infant who is the subject of the case has now been in the home of the petitioners since February 21, 1998 without the benefit of a valid adoption consent from the parents or a currently valid pre-adoption certification order. The adoption agency that originally accepted custody of the child is no longer supervising this placement because it was not licensed in the state where the child was born. Additionally, the fees charges by the principals involved may not be entirely allowable under New York State law.

There is little statutory or caselaw guidance available to assist the court in unraveling these dilemmas, and few satisfactory remedies available for the obvious failures of those charged with caring for this child to follow the statutory requirements contained in the Domestic Relations Law. What seems apparent, however, is that along the way many purportedly well-intended people ignored the law, creating a situation that puts this adoption in jeopardy.

After an initial review of the adoption petition and the supplementary documents supplied by petitioner’s counsel with his letter dated August 3, 1999 the court issued a decision identifying legal issues of concern.

Published on: September 19, 2015

Petitioner Moves for Order Granting Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding, petitioner moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting summary judgment: (1) converting the QTIP trust to a unitrust; (2) compelling the sale of the family business interests for fair market value; (3) removing the decedent’s sister as co-trustee and requiring her to file her account; and (4) disqualifying the decedent’s father as successor co-trustee and immediately appointing an independent corporate fiduciary to succeed as co-trustee. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied, except to the extent that Deborah is directed to file an intermediate account of her acts as co-trustee of the QTIP trust as set forth below.

The decedent died testate on December 7, 2001, leaving his wife, who is now forty-six years old, and two children, who are now twenty and nineteen, respectively. Petitioner and the decedent’s sister are sisters-in-law, the latter having been decedent’s sister. Apparently, the close family relationship that existed between petitioner and the family while decedent was alive has deteriorated.

The decedent’s last will and testament dated October 28, 1998 was admitted to probate by this court in April 2002. Letters testamentary and letters of trusteeship for the QTIP trust established in the will were granted on the same date to the sister and the wife. They qualified as such and have acted and are still acting in those capacities.

Published on: September 9, 2015

Court Discusses Condemnation Proceedings

by Stephen Bilkis

In condemnation proceedings, claimant appeals, as limited by its brief and on the ground of inadequacy, from so much of a partial final decree of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 2, 1979, as awarded compensation for the improvements on the condemned realty.

In 1954, appellant leased some 361/2 acres of beachfront property on the south shore of Long Island from Ovide de St. Aubin and Manlio Liccione. (Liccione divested himself of his interest in the property prior to this proceeding.) The parties stipulated that their respective interests in the improvements in the property, in the event of condemnation, would be 71.7% to appellant and 28.3% to St. Aubin. These figures were reversed with respect to their respective interests in the land itself. Appellant constructed on the property a large clubhouse for catering, cabanas, lockers, swimming pools, tennis, handball and basketball courts, and other facilities, at a cost of.$2.5 million. The business operation of these facilities was a failure, however, and in 1968, at which time the beach club facilities had a stipulated depreciated value of $1.38 million, the facilities were condemned by the respondent town. From the time of condemnation until the present, the town operated the premises, as had appellant, as catering and recreational facilities. Indeed, the town has not made any substantial structural changes in the improvements on the property. In 1977 it realized an income of approximately $400,000 from the operation of the facilities.