M.D. (hereafter “Daughter”) moves this Court by way of notice of motion for leave to reargue this Court’s decision dated September 16, 2005, which denied her motion to seal her arrest record and also denied her request on her alternative argument to do so in the interests of justice.
The Court notes that the County Attorney’s Office “does not oppose” the instant motion for leave to reargue, even though it did oppose the initial application by the Daughter.
This case involves domestic violence and a motion to dismiss the indictment and an order transferring all the proceedings herein from the County Court to the Family Court of Nassau County was raised by the defendant. Defendant is charged with assault, second degree. The particular act involved herein arose as a result of an altercation between defendant and his wife during which the defendant is charged with stabbing his wife with a knife. The defendant urges this Court to transfer the entire proceedings to the Family Court inasmuch as the alleged assault arose during a family dispute.
They are presented with the problem of whether the Family Court, in the case of a felonious assault inflicted by one spouse upon another, is the sole and exclusive forum to the exclusion of the County Court. The act complained of for which the defendant stands indicted is clearly a crime against the State if proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of a jury (Penal Law, § 242).
This is a condemnation proceeding in which the Village of Garden City sought to acquire title in fee to certain property within the village for a parking field. The property to be acquired consists of 23 parcels all of which were heretofore zoned by the village for residential purposes. The evidence showed that a change in the zoning of property in the vicinity of the subject parcels had been under study since 1951 when the trustees of the village engaged a zoning expert to confer on a general revision of the ordinance. An advisory committee prepared and submitted to the trustees a draft of a proposed new zoning ordinance. This was the subject of a public hearing on January 25, 1953. A map delineating the proposed zone changes was dated and filed in the Nassau County Clerk’s office on March 20, 1953.
On June 25, 1953, a hearing was heard with respect to the proposed revision of the zoning ordinance before the Board of Trustees and the hearing was adjourned to July 2, 1953. On November 30, 1953, the report of the advisory committee was printed, and a memorandum was submitted by such committee to the Board of Trustees in which it was recommended that several of the parcels (D-1, D-2, and D-3, Washington Avenue frontage) be changed on the proposed map from C-O to R-6 Zone. The C-O Zone permitted the use of commercial offices on the property in that zone. In the R-6 Zone the property was restricted to one-family residences. On February 18, 1954, this recommendation was approved and adopted by the village trustees over the opposition of some of the property owners. The public hearing in relation to this condemnation proceeding was had on May 27, 1954.
This action seeking a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, and ancillary relief, was commenced on or about June 10, 2003. By order dated December 23, 2003, both parties’ applications for temporary custody were denied and an injunction was issued prohibiting either party from taking the children out of the United States. The plaintiff (Wife) was granted omnibus pendente lite financial relief pursuant to an order dated February 24, 2004. The parties entered into a written “parenting-time” stipulation on February 8, 2005. The trial of the action commenced on February 1, 2005. On that date, an inquest was conducted on grounds and the plaintiff was granted a judgment of divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment. Entry of the judgment of divorce was stayed pending the determination, after trial, of ancillary issues.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court reserved decision, pending receipt of post-trial memoranda and summations which were thereafter served and filed by both plaintiff’s counsel, defendant’s counsel and the law guardian.
Background
Under the Federal public assistance program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), family income is considered in determining a child’s eligibility for relief. All of a natural father’s income is typically deemed available to his child, but the situation is more complicated where stepfathers are found. The Federal Regulations allow consideration of all of the stepfather’s income in estimating the child’s eligibility only if the applicable State law establishes a general obligation on all stepfathers to support their stepchildren, but not where the stepfather is liable to support only a stepchild likely to be a public charge.
In this decision we find, after reconciling a confusing statutory scheme, that in New York there is no general obligation of stepfathers to support their stepchildren, and that these support obligations only occur where the child is otherwise to become a public charge, or under special circumstances of agreement or estoppel. Accordingly, the stepfather’s entire income is not automatically figured to the stepchild, but as explained below, on familiar social services principles, only so much of it as is actually devoted to the child.
This personal injury action, stemming from a multi-vehicle collision, raises interesting issues regarding consolidation, venue, comity, judicial economy, the avoidance of forum shopping, and a seeming conflict between the “first-in-time rule” and the convenience of material witnesses where actions have been filed in two or more counties concerning the same set of facts. The novel aspect of this motion to consolidate and to transfer venue is that prior to the institution of the aforecaptioned action in this Court, the second lawsuit in this litigation, a Justice of Supreme Court, Kings County, transferred the first action to Suffolk County.
The plaintiff DD, a resident of Bergen County, New Jersey, was allegedly injured on November 16, 2008, at 4:45 A.M., while driving in Kings County, New York, on the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway near the Williamsburg Bridge. According to a police accident report, taken by the New York City Police Department, the accident involved four vehicles, and two persons were allegedly injured.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR to review a determination of the respondent, City of New York, Department of Housing Preservation and Development (hereafter referred to as “HPD”), which purported to deny Petitioner’s appeal for family succession rights pursuant to 28 RCNY§3-02(p) concerning a Mitchell-Lama apartment Petitioner occupies with his wife and nine children. The apartment Is owned and operated by the respondent, Kent Village Housing Company, Inc. (hereafter referred to as “Kent Village”) and is known as Apartment 4D at 116 Clymer Street, Brooklyn, New York (hereafter referred to as the “Apartment”). In his petition Petitioner alleges that he never applied for family succession rights to the Apartment Instead,
Petitioner contends that he Is a co-tenant who has been named on the lease for the Apartment since In or around 1997. Petitioner further alleges that he resides In the Apartment based upon his own rights as a co-tenant and that there Is no statutory basis for HPD to Institute, prosecute or determine any proceedings In Petitioner’s name for family succession rights to the Apartment Therefore, Petitioner argues that HPD’s determination denying him family succession rights and authorizing his eviction from the Apartment Is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, affected by errors of law and in violation of lawful procedure. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a Judgment annulling and vacating HPD’s determination and declaring Petitioner’s rights vis-a-vis HPD and Kent Village with respect to the Apartment
Upon the foregoing papers, petitioners individually, as preliminary executor of the estate of the decedent and as the vested beneficial owner of shares of the respondent 4C Foods Corp. held by certain trusts, moves for an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 2221 granting leave to renew respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition that was granted in this court’s order dated December 5, 2012, and upon renewal, denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition; and (2), pursuant to CPLR 3025, granting petitioners leave to file and serve an amended petition.
Petitioners’ motion is denied with respect to petitioners’ claims pursuant to Business Corporation Law §§ 623 and 806. With respect to the proposed causes of action premised on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty, the motion to amend is denied, but with leave to file an amended pleading containing such causes of action upon the following events: (1) the executor of the estate of the decedent, is barred from transferring voting shares individually; (2) these voting shares are purchased by respondent, its directors and or its majority shareholders; and (3) such causes of action are not otherwise rendered moot by any determination made in the Nassau County declaratory judgment action. The motion for leave to file an amended petition is granted with respect to the proposed declaratory judgment claim in which petitioner seeks a declaration that the January 11, 2013 notice addressing the transfer of voting shares formerly controlled is a nullity. The special proceeding is converted to a declaratory judgment action, but any further proceedings in the action are stayed pending the determination of the Nassau County declaratory judgment action.
The petitioner/mother, and the respondent/father, were divorced by judgment of divorce, dated February 14, 2000 and entered by the Nassau County Clerk on February 15, 2000. The judgment of divorce granted the parties joint legal custody of their children. Physical custody was awarded to the petitioner, subject to the respondent’s right to visitation as set forth in their separation agreement, dated August 31, 1998, which was incorporated (but did not merge) with the judgment of divorce. The separation agreement provided, among other things, that the father would have mid-week overnight visitation with the children.
On April 17, 2003, the petitioner filed an application with this Court for modification of the visitation provisions of the judgment of divorce. The petition requested that the respondent’s mid-week visitation be eliminated, as it was “not practical” because her new husband, had secured employment in the Albany, New York area. The petition stated that she and her four children (the two Jones children and the two children of her current marriage) would relocate to the Albany area to join her husband on or about June 30, 2003, at the end of the school year.
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for the cost of tuition for a foster child, pursuant to Education Law section 3202(5)(a) which provides for the distribution of the cost of educating indigent children among the school districts of this state. This child’s mother, was confined to the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility at Bedford Hills, New York when the child was born on June 27, 1965. The mother, immediately prior to her incarceration, resided for several months in 1964 within the Amityville Central School District. She remained in prison until January 5, 1970 and has thereafter not returned to live in Amityville.
The Nassau County Department of Social Services assumed responsibility for the support and maintenance of Cheryl on February 16, 1966, and ever since, has had her in their charge. It appears that the child was placed in foster care in Westbury at the age of eight months and has received her education within the schools of the plaintiff Westbury School District.
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