New York Family Law Blog

Published on: September 26, 2022

Does the SUNY cap apply in determining parental contribution to educational expenses? Pamela T. v. Marc B., 930 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2011)

by Stephen Bilkis

In New York, as part of a divorce and child support settlement, parents can be required to contribute to their children’s educational expenses. The SUNY Cap attempts to limit the required contribution of both parents to the cost of State University of New York (SUNY) tuition. In Pamela T. v. Marc B., a high-conflict divorce with substantial assets, the parents disagreed on each parent’s contribution to college tuition of one of their children, with one parent wanting to limit it to the SUNY cap.

Background

Plaintiff Pamela T. and Defendant Marc B. divorced in 2008. They had two children. The parties had similar annual salaries, each earning just over $100,000 per year. Pamela had approximately $1,200,000 in assets. Marc had approximately $600,000 in assets. Both Pamela and Marc attended private colleges and both have law degrees. Their amended stipulation of settlement addressed child custody and child support. Pamela was awarded custody and Marc was ordered to pay child support. However, it did not address payment of the children’s college tuition and expenses.

Published on: September 21, 2022

New York Supreme Court discussed the concept of zones of final decision-making authority in point custody situations. J.R. v. M.S., 55 N.Y.S.3d 873 (2017)

by Stephen Bilkis

Child-rearing decisions are often challenging when couples divorce or otherwise end their romantic relationship. In some cases, there is so much animosity between parents that they are unable to effectively communicate with respect to the needs of the child. In J.R. v. M.S., the New York Supreme Court was asked to decide on the custody arrangement where they had a history of having trouble working together to make certain child-rearing decisions.

Background

The parties were married in 1999. There were tensions throughout their marriage and the tensions intensified after the birth of their only child in 2007. In 2013, the father revealed he had an affair and the couple separated. In January 2014, the father filed for divorce. In September 2014, the parties entered into an agreement setting forth an interim parental access schedule. For the next two years, the parties attempted to agree on a parenting plan. There were countless settlement conferences and numerous draft agreements. Ultimately, the parties were unable to reach a compromise.

Published on: September 19, 2022

Appellate Division determined that child support payments may be suspended if the custodial parent unjustifiably prevented access to the child. Usack v. Usack, 17 A.D.3d 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

by Stephen Bilkis

Generally, child support and custody are two different issues. Parental access is not based on the amount of child support is paid or whether it is paid on time or is in arrears. This means that a parent who has been ordered to pay chid support cannot stop paying child support simply because they have not had access to the child. In Usack v. Usack, the Appellate Division was asked to review this general rule in circumstances where the custodial parent intentionally prevents the non-custodial, child support paying parent access.

Background

Plaintiff James Usack and Defendant Linda Usack were married for 20 years and had three children. Linda had a good relationship with the children. After Linda had an affair with another man, James filed for divorce. James told the children about the affair, and from that point on, the children’s relationship with Linda was strained. The Supreme Court of New York granted James custody of the children and ordered Linda to pay child support a portion of the uninsured medical expenses for all three children.

Published on: September 14, 2022

A family court can grant a protection order prohibiting a minor from contacting a child, even though the minor is too young for criminal prosecution. Emily K. v. Luis J., 997 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (2014)

by Stephen Bilkis

In New York, a family court proceeding, pursuant to Article 8, allows a petitioner, the opportunity to civilly address an action that would otherwise be a crime. A family court proceeding under Article 8 is entirely different from a criminal prosecution for the same types of allegations, or even the exact same incident. However, in a criminal prosecution, the case is brought by the District.

Background

Luis J., and the petitioner’s daughter were each 13 years old when the petition was filed. They had been in an on-and-off dating relationship for several years. The two were classmates in kindergarten and had an intermittent boyfriend-girlfriend relationship from fifth to eighth grade. Initially, the relationship involved handholding, kissing, texting, and phone calls. The daughter testified that by sixth grade, Luis J. was texting or calling several times a day and has become jealous, controlling, and isolating.

Published on: September 12, 2022

The ICWA is applicable to the adoption of a Native American child even if the child’s Native American parents do not participate in tribal life. In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2005)

by Stephen Bilkis

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) was enacted in response to practices that separated large numbers of Native American children from their families and tribe. See 25 USC § 1901 et seq. It is common for representatives from the relevant Indian tribe to intervene in child custody proceedings involving Indian children. The ICWA established certain placement preferences for Indian children who, as in the case of In re Baby Boy C., are no longer in their parents’ custody.

Background

Defendant Rita C., a Native American member of the Tohono O’odham Nation tribe (Tribe), gave birth to Baby Boy C. in March 2004. The father, Justin W., was not Native American. Rita grew up in a tribal community but eventually left it and no longer participated in its political, social, and religious affairs. Her other children were not being raised in a tribal community.

Published on: September 7, 2022

New York Supreme Court considered a divorce petition even though a divorce was already granted in another state. Weiss v. Weiss, 29 Misc. 3d 1202(A) (2010)

by Stephen Bilkis

A divorce proceeding must be initiated in the state where at least one of the parties is domiciled. Not only must one of the parties be domiciled in the state where the divorce proceeding is initiated, the person must have met the minimum residency requirements.

In Weis v. Weis, because of there was a question related to residency requirements, the New York Supreme Court was asked to grant a divorce even though the other spouse had sought and was granted a divorce in another state.

Background

Published on: September 5, 2022

Appellate Division found that a trial court cannot confirm a custody order that was determined by arbitration. Schechter v. Schechter, 63 A.D.3d 817, 881 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2009)

by Stephen Bilkis

In Schechter v. Schechter, the court considered whether a religious arbitration tribunal could determine child custody and whether the Supreme Court could then confirm the arbitration decision.

Background

David Schechter, the plaintiff and Wendy Zehava Schechter, the defendant entered into an agreement pursuant to which they agreed to arbitrate all marital issues between them before a rabbinical arbitration tribunal, the Bais Din. The Bais Din wrote a decision, awarding the parties joint custody of the couple’s 14-year-old daughter. David filed a motion to confirm the arbitration agreement before the Supreme Court, Nassau County, the appropriate trial court. Wendy consented to the trial court confirming the award with certain exceptions.

Published on: January 21, 2022

A fault-based divorce should not be granted without sufficient proof of constructive abandonment. Molinari v. Molinari, 2007 WL 1119894 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2007)

by Stephen Bilkis

Fault divorce is granted when one spouse proves that the other spouse did something which resulted in the failure of the marriage. Under New York Domestic Relations Law, grounds for fault-based divorce include:

Cruel and inhuman treatment. DRL §170.1
Abandonment for a continuous period of one year or more. DRL §170.2

Published on: January 3, 2022

New York recognizes the same-sex of marriage validly entered into outside of New York. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2008)

by Stephen Bilkis

At the time that this case was decided, New York did not recognize same sex marriage. The law changed on June 24, 2011. Before that time, it was common for same sex couples to get married outside of New York in jurisdictions that did recognize same sex marriage. Just like with any marriage, when same sex relationships dissolved, legal questions related to child custody and child support had to be resolved. In Beth R. v. Donna M., the Supreme Court of New York was asked to determine whether New York recognizes same sex marriages validity entered into outside of New York and what the rights and obligations are of the parties regarding child custody and child support.

Background

Plaintiff Beth R. and Defendant Donna M., both residents of New York, met in 1999 and soon thereafter entered into an intimate relationship. The moved in together in 2002. In 2003, Donna became pregnant through artificial insemination.

Published on: April 20, 2020

Separation and Property Settlement Agreement Prepared by Mediator Was Not Unconscionable- Irizarry v Hayes, 2020 NY Slip Op 50217(U)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether the terms of a separation agreement prepared by a non-attorney mediator were unconscionable and as a result should be voided.

A separation agreement is a document agreed to by a husband and wife in which they agree to the conditions related to how they are going to live separately, such as property division, spousal maintenance, child custody, and child support. While a separation agreement is not always a precursor to a divorce, it can be. In fact, when filing for a divorce in New York, you must state the grounds for the action. One of the possible grounds is that the couple has been separated pursuant to a separation agreement. According to Dom. Rel. Law §170 (6), if a couple signed and notarized a separation agreement, are not living together, and have abided by the terms of the agreement, then they would have grounds for divorce.

In this case Irizarry v Hayes, the couple married in 2008 and had one child. A prenuptial agreement was drafted. Both parties were aware of its terms and agreed to them, but only the husband signed it. As a result, the prenuptial agreement was not enforceable. Several years later the couple experienced problems. After meeting with a mediator, the couple signed a separation agreement in 2016. In the agreement they acknowledged that they were encouraged to seek the advice of independent counsel, that they had the opportunity to seek independent counsel and financial advisors to review the agreement, and that by signing it they agreed to file an uncontested divorce action. The husband then filed an action for an uncontested divorce, and in her answer the wife consented to the uncontested divorce. The wife also stated in the answer that she “waives her right to any additional equitable distribution of marital property insomuch as all properties ever jointly owed, shared or enjoyed, have been distributed between the parties voluntarily prior to the commencement of the action by and through their Separation and Property Settlement Agreement.” The couple received a judgement of divorce.