New York Family Law Blog

Published on: August 14, 2016

Deed Claimed Invalid During Divorce Hearing

by Stephen Bilkis

On August 31, 1992, the couple were in the process of buying a home. The husband’s father, a wealthy and successful entrepreneur, decided to help his son, daughter-in-law, and their young children in moving into the home. The husband’s father arranged a $47,000 transfer to the couple through an entity identified as the retirement plan corporation. There is no evidence before this court on how the money was advanced. There is no check from any bank account evidencing the advance of funds from corporation to the couple. At the time the father-in-law advanced the funds, he had the couple sign a mortgage on the house they were acquiring. The interest rate on the mortgage was one per cent.

For five years, the annual payment was never made. There is no evidence that the father-in-law sought payment of the annual amount from his son or daughter-in-law.

In 1997, the couple wanted to move and needed additional funds to do so. In another generous gesture, the husband’s mother advanced an additional $100,000 to her son and daughter-in-law top facilitate their purchase of a second home. The mother-in-law requested that the couple sign a mortgage for $100,000.

Published on: August 13, 2016

Defendant Father Requests Hospital Records in Light of HIPPA Laws

by Stephen Bilkis

There are several issues currently pending before the Court in this mid-fact-finding Family Court Act article 10 proceeding. The first issue is whether to grant the motion of respondent father-person legally responsible (hereinafter, “respondent father”) to compel the production of the subject child, Lizmarie B.’s, post-incident hospital records, despite her opposition and refusal to execute a HIPAA release. The second issue is whether to grant the motion of the Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter, “ACS”) to admit the criminal record of respondent father, over his objection. The third is whether to grant the motion of ACS for reargument or renewal of the Court’s July 28, 2008 order and decision, based on actions of respondent mother that took place “subsequent to when this court was rendering its decision regarding this matter during the summer months of 2008.” The attorney for the two older children supports the motion for reargument or renewal, which is opposed by respondent mother and the attorney for the younger children. For the reasons set forth herein, the first two motions are granted and the third is denied.

Valerie B. (hereinafter “respondent mother”) and Leocadio B. Sr. (hereinafter “respondent father”) are the parents of two of the subject children, Leocadio B. Jr., born January 1, 2000 and Andrea B., born January 1, 1998. The other two children, Lizmarie B., born May 25, 1989 and Jasmine B., born July 9, 1993, are the nieces of the respondent father.1 On November22, 2006, at approximately 1:00 AM, ACS removed the subject children Lizmarie and Jasmine B. from the care of the respondents without a court order pursuant to Family Court Act §1024.

On November 22, 2006, ACS filed petitions against both respondents. The petitions allege that respondent father raped the subject child Lizmarie on November 20, 2006 after watching a pornographic film with her and that he had raped her once before in February 2005. In addition, the petitions allege that respondent mother failed to provide adequate care and supervision for the children Leocadio Jr. and Andrea by allowing respondent father to leave the home with the children after she learned that he had sexually abused Lizmarie. Finally, the petitions allege that Jasmine, Andrea and Leocadio Jr. are derivatively abused and neglected children by virtue of the abuse of Lizmarie.2 On the day the petitions were filed, Hon. Anne Feldman granted the request of ACS for a remand of all of the children. The subject children Leocadio Jr. and Andrea were removed at approximately 9:00 PM, pursuant to the court-ordered remand.

Published on: August 12, 2016

Court Decides Authority of Probation Officers

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, the petitioners, Probation Officers with permanent status in the Nassau County Probation Department, question the authority of the respondent, as the State Administrator of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York to exercise jurisdiction over the examinations for positions in the Probation Department and the reasonableness of the eligibility requirements fixed by him for the promotion examination that was to be conducted on November 18, 1967 for the position of Supervising Probation Officer.

Specifically, petitioners urge: that the Nassau County Probation Department is not a part of the unified court system of the State of New York; that the reduction in eligibility requirements for candidates from those specified in Exhibit B (Nassau County Civil Service Commission notice of examination dated December 15, 1962) to those specified in Exhibit A (announcement for written test on November 18, 1967 of Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference) so that persons with less experience and training would be eligible, would result in placing supervision in the hands of persons who were not qualified, and would increase from 36 to 80 the number of probation officers eligible to take the examination.

Examination of the papers submitted and of the law satisfied the Court that the Administrative Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter and that it was not unreasonable for it, through its administrator, to adopt the requirements for the position as revealed in Exhibit A.

Published on: August 11, 2016

Court Discusses Mechanic’s Lien Law

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a family case commenced on February 25, 2005 by the filing of a Summons and Complaint in the Supreme Court of Nassau County setting forth two causes of action against the Defendant sounding in breach of contract and an account stated, and a third cause of action against all Defendants seeking to foreclose a mechanics lien filed by the Plaintiff on a real property. The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Pendency with the Nassau County Clerk at the same time.

Legal counsel said that the issue was joined with the Defendants on or about September 26, 2005. None of the other Defendants have appeared or answered herein; and, the Plaintiff advises that a money judgment has been submitted to the Clerk of the Court as to the Defendant. The Plaintiff originally moved for summary judgment on its third cause of action in the Supreme Court of Nassau County.

The Defendants opposed the motion. Following submission of the motion this matter was transferred to the District Court of Nassau County, pursuant to CPLR § 325(d). The papers previously submitted, both for and against the Plaintiff’s motion, have now been submitted to this court.

Published on: August 10, 2016

Petitioner Seeks Assistance with Section 8 Subsidy

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Article 78 proceeding, it is undisputed that petitioner, who had received a Section 8 rent subsidy, did not submit her annual income certification documents, and that respondent New York City Housing Authority terminated petitioner’s Section 8 rent subsidy. Petitioner then wrote to the agency, asking it “to give her family a chance,” and to “Please inform me & my family what we can do to fix my situation.” Petitioner challenges the agency’s determination denying petitioner’s request.

Respondent Rhea and the New York City Housing Authority (collectively, NYCHA) cross-move to dismiss the Article 78 petition as time-barred. Petitioner opposes the motion. NYCHA argues that petitioner’s request was merely a request to restore her subsidy; petitioner argues that the request sought to reopen her default.

NYCHA must follow certain procedures to terminate Section 8 assistance, which were established in a First Partial Consent Judgment entered into on October 4, 1984 in Williams v. New York City Housing Authority.

Published on: August 9, 2016

Court Orders Plaintiff to Amend Complaint

by Stephen Bilkis

On October 28, 2001, plaintiff’s decedent, LM, fell in his apartment, which was located in the Narragansett Hotel, a residential hotel in New York City. A neighbor heard yelling coming from the apartment and called an ambulance. According to the Ambulance Call Report prepared by the EMS workers, he was found “lying in apt, full of feces.” The report indicated that he had fallen down in his apartment and was, inter alia, having difficulty breathing. It was also noted in the report that he had an elevated heart rate of 132 beats per minute, while in the care of the EMS workers. In addition to the information relating to his medical condition, the Ambulance Call Report contained LM’s address, date of birth and social security number. The Ambulance Call Report also listed JT, a close friend of LM, as his next of kin, and contained Ms. JT’s telephone number.

LM was taken by ambulance to the emergency room at Mount Sinai Hospital at approximately 1:55 p.m. The Ambulance Call Report, prepared by the EMS workers, was received by a staff member at Mount Sinai, who signed the report as the Hospital Receiving Agent. An Emergency Department, Patient Registration Form was prepared, at some point, after LM’s arrival at the hospital, and contained the same pedigree information as the Ambulance Call Report, i.e., address, date of birth and social security number. Mount Sinai’s Patient Registration Form also listed JT as LM’s next of kin, and contained her telephone number. A triage assessment was performed, and the records indicate that, at that time, LM was still experiencing shortness of breath and was noted to, among other things, have an elevated heart rate. The triage records state that LM was disheveled in appearance and full of feces. It appears that no treatment was administered in triage. Notwithstanding, he was given acute priority, and sent to an acute area of the emergency department. It is noted that the triage records also contain LM’s pedigree information.

LM was assessed by Dr. JJB, Jr., an attending physician, in the emergency room at Mount Sinai. He was found to be in respiratory distress, with edema, which is the swelling of the extremities. The emergency room records indicate that LM’s heart rate was a very high 160 beats per minute, at the time. Dr. JJB testified at his deposition that his preliminary diagnosis was congestive heart failure, as a result of, or a cause of, arterial fibrillation. Dr. JJB also entertained the possibility of pneumonia and heart ischemia. He considered LM to be a critically ill patient. Dr. JJB testified that he put a nonrebreather face mask on LM with the highest concentration of oxygen. The use of the nonrebreather face mask was documented in the emergency room records. According to Dr. JJB, he administered Diltiazem to reduce LM’s heart rate and “would typically” administer a dose of Lasix to get rid of extra body fluid. Dr. JJB further testified that he would have probably given LM an antibiotic in case there was pneumonia. Notwithstanding Dr. JJB testimony with respect to the administering of the aforementioned treatments, with the exception of the use of the nonrebreather mask, the emergency room records did not indicate that LM was provided with any of the other treatments discussed by Dr. JJB at his deposition. Additionally, Dr. JJB testified that nurses at Mount Sinai assisted in the emergency room treatment provided to LM, however, it does not appear that any nursing notes were generated in connection with such treatment.

Published on: August 8, 2016

Petitioner Seeks to Vacate Determination by Department of Consumer Affairs

by Stephen Bilkis

Legal counsel said that, the current motion by Petitioner is to vacate a determination of the Nassau County Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) to the effect that Plaintiff Corporation was an unlicensed home improvement contractor in violation of the Nassau County Administrative Code. The Cross-motion, denominated a motion by the Respondent, is to confirm the determination of the DCA.

The related action is by plaintiff to recover $90,000 held in escrow after the transfer of title to a single family residence from North Sea to the respondent. The $90,000 included $65,000 which was due to plaintiff on receipt of a Certificate of Completion, and $25,000 for work to be completed after the transfer of title. This Court has previously awarded plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $65,000. The respondent filed a complaint with the DCA that plaintiff was not entitled to payment because they were operating as an unlicensed home improvement contractor in violation of Local Law 6-1970, § 21-11.2.1 The parties appeared for a hearing before Hearing Officer, on June 19, 20082, and a determination was rendered on June 22, 2008. It found Elm Sea in violation of the ordinance and fined them $500.3 A Nassau Order of Protection Lawyer said that, plaintiff appealed and a final determination was rendered on July 9, 2008.4 The Commissioner of the Office of Consumer Affairs rejected the arguments of plaintiff that the work performed on the residence after the closing was in accordance with a contract of sale in which plaintiff, as owner, agreed to perform work on the premises prior to closing. The Commissioner distinguished between the work done before the transfer of title, when plaintiff was arranging for work on its own home, and work done in accordance with a “punch list”. The Respondent concluded that the change order was a contract for home improvement for which a license was required.

The Court concludes that the determination by the Respondent that the “Punch List” constituted a separate and distinct home improvement contract requiring a license for performance is unreasonable. The determination is vacated and the fine in the amount of $500 is set aside. There is no controversy but that the work done by Elm Sea on the home to which it took title on September 1, 20066 did not require a home improvement license. The work was done in accordance with necessary permits and was approved by issuance of certificates of completion.

Published on: August 7, 2016

Respondent Asserts Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiff and her two children are clients of the Nassau County Department of Social Services (Department). On or about May 29, 1971, she received a public assistance check from the Department. Several days later, while her possessions were being moved to a new place, she claims to have noticed that her handbag, containing the remaining proceeds of her grant, had disappeared.

Upon discovering her loss, plaintiff telephoned the local police to report the loss, notified the Department and requested that her grant be duplicated. The Department denied the request on the ground that duplicate grants are not issued by the Department in accordance with its applicable policy. Plaintiff thereupon instituted this Article 78 proceeding to direct the respondent Commissioner of the Department to issue a duplicate grant in replacement of the stolen amount. She asserts without contradiction that her destitute circumstances have compelled her to borrow funds from friends to supply her family with food, that she has been unable to pay rent in her new premises as a result, and that she and her family now face eviction.

Respondent asserts that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and that duplicate grants are not available in replacement of stolen funds. Respondent has called to the attention of the Court that substantial expenditures of County funds may be required to make the type of duplicate payments requested by petitioner, and that reimbursement for such expenditures has not been available from the State since July 1, 1969.

Published on: August 6, 2016

Interesting Case Decides Parenting Rights of Surrogate Mother

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a Family case wherein Plaintiffs appealed in an action for a judgment, inter alia, declaring the plaintiff D.Y.-V. to be the legal mother of a child born on May 1, 2009, to the plaintiff N.N. and declaring article 8 of the Domestic Relations Law and Family Court Act §§ 517 and 542 unconstitutional and void and, upon such declaration, directing the defendant to amend the child’s birth certificate, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, entered January 21, 2010, in Nassau County, as granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action.

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In 1999, the plaintiff (hereinafter the Genetic Mother) underwent a hysterectomy after it was discovered that her uterus was surrounded by a malignant tumor which rendered her unable to conceive, carry, and give birth to a child. Her ovaries were left intact.

After her subsequent marriage to the plaintiff T.V., the Genetic Mother desired to have a biological child with the Genetic Father. In order to do so, the plaintiff Gestational Mother, a close friend of the Genetic Parents, offered to act as a gestational surrogate of the eggs of the Genetic Mother which had been fertilized with the sperm of the Genetic Father through in vitro fertilization. No fee was sought by or provided to the Gestational Mother as she undertook to carry the Genetic Parents’ child “out of friendship, compassion, and her desire to assist the [Genetic Parents] in becoming parents of their own biological child.”

Published on: August 5, 2016

Court Hears Motion to Disqualify Defendant Counsel

by Stephen Bilkis

The People’s motion for an order disqualifying Defendant’s counsel and precluding use at trial of statements of prosecution witnesses taken by defense counsel or his associates is denied. Defendant’s cross-motion for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument as facially defective, in the interests of justice, or on account of the People’s failure to be ready for trial within the prescribed time, and suppressing statements he made to law enforcement officials in violation of the procedures enunciated in a case, is denied as noted below.

A Nassau lawyer said that the People commenced this action in November 2005 by the filing of what is labeled an information that accuses Defendant of sexual abuse in the second degree. By the factual part (see CPL 100.15[3]), the complainant, a Detective attests that “on 11/19/2005 and about 11:00 a.m. while at a Freeport, the defendant did enter the bedroom of the mentally retarded 16 year old female and did expose his erect penis. Said defendant did take the victim’s hand in his own and put the victim’s hand on his erect penis and did masturbate himself to ejaculation with the victim’s hand.”

“The above is based on information and belief. The source of said information and the basis of the belief is the interview and statement of the victim and the interview and statement of admission of the defendant.”